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EQUAL LIBERTY IN PROPORTION
JOSHUA E. WEISHART*
ABSTRACT
As federal law continues to devolve more education policy making
to states, state courts will remain a primary forum for settling
education rights. State fora do not inspire confidence, however,
because their doctrine is so uncertain. A majority of state supreme
courts do not specify a level of scrutiny and at times seem to be
improvising judicial review. The resulting decisions can exhibit a
troubling lack of foresight. Most notably, while federal doctrine
increasingly reveals the interrelation of liberty and equality claims,
state courts have failed to capitalize on that point—even though their
decisions were among the first to concede it. Too often, instead, they
pigeonhole education claims into one category or the other when the
claims should fit in both.
This Article proposes that courts analyze the state constitutional
right to education as a claim for “equal liberty” and subject it to a
new standard of review. State court adjudication of the right to
education over the past five decades reflects ambivalence with
heightened scrutiny in favor of an ad hoc means-ends review. That
review confers substantial deference to legislative judgment and has
excused persistent educational disparities based on the “reasonable-
ness” of legislative efforts. To overcome these shortcomings and
lingering justiciability concerns, courts need a principled methodol-
ogy for reconciling liberty and equality interests.
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Against tradition calling for these interests to be “balanced,” I
contend that equality and liberty can yet maintain a positive, directly
proportional relationship in the law. Applying direct-proportionality
review, the judicial lens should focus on whether the state’s actions
advance both equality and liberty interests in tandem and whether
the margin between these ends is proportional so as to protect child-
ren from the harms of educational disparities. Reviewing the propor-
tionality of these constitutional interests is urgently needed as public
schooling endures chronic inequitable and inadequate funding while
our highest elected officials question its value.
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INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice John Roberts is not feeling the “synergy” between
equal protection and due process conveyed in Obergefell v. Hodges.1
The Chief Justice “quite frankly” finds such talk “difficult to
follow.”2 He is not alone. Even among those who agree with the
judgment, there is a sense of wonder as to how exactly these two
doctrines are supposed to coincide.3 As Roberts observed, Justice
Anthony Kennedy seemed averse to the “means-ends methodology”
built into the tiers of scrutiny—that is, the “usual framework,” the
“casebook doctrine.”4 Echoing themes from his opinions in Lawrence
v. Texas5 and United States v. Windsor,6 Kennedy instead posited
that equal protection and due process were somehow “instructive as
to the meaning and reach of the other” such that either one might
“capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehen-
sive way, even as [both] may converge in the identification and
definition of the right.”7 To which an exasperated Justice Antonin
Scalia replied in dissent, “Huh?” and “What say?”8
In fairness, trying to fuse equal protection and due process is a
tall order. Wrapped in this doctrinal riddle is an ancient, Aristote-
lian enigma: how to reconcile equality and liberty.9 Renewed in
modern times by the works of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, the
reconciliation of equality and liberty has been a hallmark endeavor
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 281, 303 (2015) (proposing irrationality as the test for equal protection and due
process emerging from the line of precedent leading to Obergefell); Deborah Hellman, Two
Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 949-51 (2016) (suggesting that “we can better
understand the somewhat opaque statements in Obergefell” by considering whether discrim-
ination is perceived as a comparative or noncomparative wrong).
4. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting G. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 453 (7th ed. 2013)).
5. 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
6. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
7. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
8. Id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 103-04 (2007) (recognizing a “tradition of equal liberty dating to
ancient days” of Aristotle).
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of contemporary liberalism.10 For those envisioning a “liberal consti-
tutionalism,” the project of balancing these demands has been no
less important.11 The only consensus to have emerged, however, is
the recognition that the two principles can be mutually exclusive or
reinforcing, depending on one’s conception of equality and liberty.12
Regardless of how they are conceived, there is no question that
both belong in our constitutional order—they literally share the
same space in the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The question is do they
belong together in the same case and controversy, and if so, how?
Obergefell punctuated the point, made repeatedly in prior precedent
but seldom relied on, that equal protection and due process can be
employed together in the same case to resolve certain claims.14 A
substantial body of scholarship has also endorsed the synergy or
synthesis of equal protection and due process.15 Validated by
10. See generally DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 262 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the
competing views on how to pursue equality and liberty); Gerald Gaus et al., Liberalism, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2015/entries/liberalism/ [https://perma.cc/E9BE-BKQG] (discussing the vari-
ous theories of liberal justice put forth by Rawls and others).
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice, 72 TEX. L. REV.
305, 305-06 (1993); see also JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY:
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 146-47 (2013); GOODWIN LIU ET AL., KEEPING FAITH
WITH THE CONSTITUTION 140, 148-49 (2010).
12. See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV.
1, 6, 12 (1987); Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the
Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 583, 614 (1991); Cass R.
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411 (1994).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” (emphasis added)).
14. In addition to Lawrence and Windsor, notable prior precedent invoking both equal
protection and due process includes M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (claiming “[d]ue
process and equal protection principles converge” (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,
665 (1983))), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967), Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956),
and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
15. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 73 (1996); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 84 (2010); David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1254 (2005); Rebecca L.
Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1505-06 (2002); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1183, 1216 (2000); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 211, 274 (1993); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence
of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 891 (2014); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due
Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002);
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Obergefell, scholars continue to contemplate hybrid equality-liberty
claims evolving into claims for “equal dignity” or “antisubordina-
tion.”16
But while the legal theory is ascendant, it is incomplete—the
second part of the question of how to apply equal protection and due
process together goes unanswered.17 The standard of review remains
undetermined, and perhaps that is the way the current chief
architect, Justice Kennedy, wants it.18 But for those who look to the
law for a modicum of predictability, objectivity, or uniformity, it is
disconcerting.19 In fact, this very problem has persisted for decades
in state courts, which were among the first courts to contemplate
the interrelation of equality and liberty interests, yet have likewise
struggled with the doctrine and the applicable standard of review.20
Over the past five decades, the highest courts in nearly every
state have decided constitutional challenges to school finance
systems.21 Initially, plaintiffs asserted equal protection guarantees
to demand more equitable funding across school districts.22 In
lockstep with federal doctrine, the early court decisions followed the
traditional means-ends methodology for equal protection claims,
employing the tiers of scrutiny (strict, intermediate, and rational
basis).23 Later, plaintiffs also invoked the education clauses in state
Karst, supra note 9, at 99-100; Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (2008); Laurence H. Tribe,
Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1893, 1902-03 (2004); Richard B. Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality,
12 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182, 183 (1955); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 747, 788-89 (2011).
16. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Response, The Supreme Court 2014 Term—Forum: Equal
Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 20, 25 (2015); Kenji Yoshino, The
Supreme Court 2014 Term—Comment: A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129
HARV. L. REV. 147, 177 (2015).
17. See Hellman, supra note 3, at 941 (“Should we always combine the clauses, or only
sometimes? Are there reasons not to? And when they are combined, as they are in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, what does it mean?” (footnote omitted)).
18. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
19. Cf. Roy G. Spece, Jr., Standards of Review and Constitutional Analysis of Health Care
Issues, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 477, 480 (1994) (“[S]tandards of review are essential to the
rule of law.”).
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra note 37 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.
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constitutions to support their assertion that states had a positive,
affirmative duty to ensure children access to a level of funding
sufficient to meet qualitative educational thresholds.24 With this
shift in focus from equity to “adequacy,” several courts quietly
abandoned the tiers of scrutiny altogether or ceased to actually
apply them, paying only lip service to their guidance.25 Instead,
many of these courts now, without bothering to specify a standard,
couch their analysis in the form of a bare bones means-ends
review.26
On further examination, however, the means are hardly ever
scrutinized. In yet another departure from federal convention, these
state courts have perceived deference to the legislative means as
more in line with separation of powers—a concern courts have been
especially sensitive to in adjudicating the right to education.27
Consequently, courts are more inclined simply to determine whether
the state has achieved “the constitutionally prescribed end”—that
is, equity and adequacy (as fonts of equality and liberty).28 Alterna-
tively, courts assess the “reasonableness” of the fit between the
means and ends,29 that is, whether the legislative means are at least
“reasonably calculated” to meet the ends.30
All told, the lesson from state court jurisprudence of the right to
education is that a traditional means-ends review is ill-suited to the
task of adjudicating equal liberty claims when the right implicated
imposes affirmative obligations on the state to protect the right-
holder from discernable harms.31 Although the emergent ends-to-fit
review might better accommodate positive rights enforcement, it
does not provide a principled method for reconciling equality and
24. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educa-
tional Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 741
(2010).
28. See, e.g., McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 248, 252 (Wash. 2012) (quoting Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1999)).
29. See, e.g., Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778
(Tex. 2005).
30. See, e.g., Gannon v. State (Gannon I), 319 P.3d 1196, 1236-37 (Kan. 2014) (per
curiam).
31. See infra Part II.A.
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liberty interests (returning to that age-old dilemma).32 Indeed, state
courts almost always conduct disjointed analyses of equity and ade-
quacy in different portions of the same opinion or in entirely sep-
arate opinions.33 This failure to mutually enforce equity and
adequacy impedes progress in addressing educational disparities
and furthers doubts about the justiciability of the right to educa-
tion.34
All of this uncertainty pervades against a backdrop of the federal
government abandoning its role in education policy making with the
recent passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).35 So
much then will continue to depend on state court adjudication of
education rights.
At last, the reservation of state courts to analyze equity and
adequacy together reflects a more profound ambivalence toward the
project of balancing equality and liberty. Rather than continue to
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915,
973-74 (2016) [hereinafter Weishart, Reconstituting]; Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending
Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 532, 542-43 (2014) [hereinafter Weishart,
Transcending].
35. The ESSA “returns nearly full discretion to the states,” including “on issues of
educational equality for disadvantaged students.” See Derek W. Black, Abandoning the
Federal Role in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (manuscript at 103), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848415
[https://perma.cc/LTN5-RXQB]. Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has called for expanding
“school choice to help free children from failing government schools.” Mercedes Schneider,
Donald J. Trump’s ‘Vision’ for Education, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2016, 10:40 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-j-trumps-vision-for-education_us_58292df6e4b02
b1f5257a5a8 [https://perma.cc/5LPF-EBUK]. Education Secretary Betsy DeVos, a philan-
thropic supporter of charter schools and voucher programs, has warned states that it would
be a “terrible mistake” to reject this “most ambitious expansion of education choice in our
nation’s history.” Andrew Ujifusa, DeVos: It Would Be a ‘Terrible Mistake’ for States Not to Ex-
pand School Choice, EDUC. WEEK: POL. K-12 (May 22, 2017, 9:32 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/
edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/05/betsy_devos_school_choice_plan_speech.html [https://perma.
cc/FXV5-JTH6]. President Trump also claims that America’s “education system [is] flush with
cash,” Inaugural Address, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 58, at 1 (Jan. 20, 2017), but in fact
“public school funding in most states continues to be unfair and inequitable, depriving
millions of U.S. students of the opportunity for success in school.” Press Release, Educ. Law
Ctr., School Funding Remains Unfair for Most Students Across the Nation (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxtYmwryVI00LWdhZjRXTTM5WUk/view [https://perma.cc/
7CW7-RMNA]; see also BRUCE BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT
CARD 1 (6th ed. 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxtYmwryVI00VDhjRGlDOUh3VE0/
view [https://perma.cc/K97H-GJB4].
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ignore this doubt or mask it with the type of opaque language in
Obergefell,36 it is time to stop laboring under the misapprehension
that equality and liberty must realize constitutional equilibrium.
Even when balance cannot (or should not) be achieved, equality and
liberty can maintain a positive, directly proportional relationship.
Translated into the right to education context, this entails a two-
part inquiry: (1) whether the state’s actions improve both equity and
adequacy in tandem, and (2) whether the margin between equity
and adequacy remains proportional so as to protect children from
the harms of educational disparities.
The first inquiry provides a mechanism for assessing the
mutually reinforcing, upward trajectory of equity and adequacy. It
is meant to enforce the notion, well-established in precedent, that
all children of different needs should have access to a high-quality
education and enjoy approximately equal chances for educational
success. The second inquiry assessing the space between equity and
adequacy is, in turn, meant to enforce the ultimate vision of equal
liberty—one in which all children are endowed with the capabilities
to function as equal citizens and to compete favorably for admission
to higher education and high-quality jobs. This direct-proportional-
ity review is at once more and less deferential to legislative prerog-
atives but delineates the judiciary’s indispensable role in mutually
enforcing children’s equality and liberty interests.
For similar equal liberty claims in other contexts, direct-propor-
tionality review could also facilitate a synergy between equal
protection and due process that even Chief Justice Roberts could
follow.
I. EQUAL LIBERTY UNDER THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
Before Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, courts construing state
constitutional rights to education unwittingly developed a prototype
equal liberty claim. According to this revisionist account of the three
“waves” of school finance litigation, state courts first conceived of
equality and liberty as mutually exclusive concepts but eventually
demonstrated their potential as mutually reinforcing demands,
36. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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inhering in the right to education.37 In the process, courts cast aside
stale versions of equality (treating all children identically) and
liberty (respecting negative freedoms from state interference with
education). In their place, courts have begun to operationalize a
more robust, integral equal liberty that demands treating differ-
ently situated children as equals according to their needs, so as to
cultivate, through state action, children’s positive freedoms to
become equal citizens.
A. Liberty-Conducive “Equality of Educational Opportunity”
Brown v. Board of Education declared that “the opportunity of an
education ... is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”38 Equal terms meant not only an end to state-sponsored seg-
regation but, advocates urged, an end to school funding disparities,
a form of wealth discrimination engendered by the overreliance on
local property taxes to finance public education.39 Thus, the first
37. According to the standard narrative, school finance litigation has occurred in three
waves, with each wave representing a different constitutional theory of liability: first wave
equality under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause; second wave equity
under state constitution equal protection and education clauses; and third wave adequacy,
also under state constitution education clauses. See generally William E. Thro, The Third
Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public
School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 222-32, 238-49 (1990) (discussing the
history of public school finance reform litigation and the impact of the Helena, Rose, and
Edgewood decisions). Some scholars have questioned the wave metaphor because “the
supposed demarcation between ‘second wave’ equity cases and ‘third wave’ adequacy cases is
not so distinct.” William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-
examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2003). For instance, in some of the early equity cases, courts
“awarded victories to plaintiffs on what could be called adequacy grounds.” Richard Briffault,
Adding Adequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL
ADEQUACY 25, 26 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007). And plaintiffs continued
to assert, and courts continued to rely on, equity-based arguments “deep into the third wave.”
See James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School Finance
Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 467-68, 468
n.35 (2004) (citing cases); see also Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Litigation: Legal
Theories, Judicial Activism, and Social Neglect, 20 J. EDUC. FIN. 143, 150 (1994). Still,
scholars tend to find the wave metaphor more helpful than not, and thus it “remains the
dominant shorthand utilized in describing the history of this litigation.” Scott R. Bauries,
Foreword: Rights, Remedies, and Rose, 98 KY. L.J. 703, 703 n.3 (2010).
38. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added).
39. See William S. Koski & Jesse Hahnel, The Past, Present, and Possible Futures of
Educational Finance Reform Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE
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legal challenges to school finance systems pressed federal courts to
recognize a right to education implicit in the U.S. Constitution that
would necessitate equal funding.40 But the Supreme Court swiftly
extinguished that claim in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, holding that education was not a fundamental right
under the Equal Protection Clause and, because wealth was not a
suspect class, that funding disparities could be rationally related to
the preservation of “[l]ocal control” over school districts—a “vital”
interest worth “some inequality.”41
Undeterred from the sudden crash of this first wave of school
finance litigation,42 advocates rode a second wave into state courts.43
There, plaintiffs asserted state, rather than federal, equal protection
guarantees, relied on the education clauses in state constitutions,
or utilized both constitutional provisions to mount their equality-
based challenges.44 This initial state court strategy achieved modest
success—plaintiffs prevailed in eight of twenty-one second-wave
cases.45 Among the eight, four courts explicitly eschewed Rodriguez
to recognize a fundamental state right to education and applied
equal protection analysis.46 The other four held funding disparities
based on the wealth of school districts unconstitutional, without
applying fundamental-rights-type equal protection analysis.47
AND POLICY 42, 43 (Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske eds., 2007).
40. See id.
41. 411 U.S. 1, 35, 49-51 (1973) (emphasis added) (first quoting Wright v. Council of the
City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original);
and then quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (emphasis added)).
42. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 601-02 (1994).
43. Just as Justice Thurgood Marshall subtly suggested they do in the last footnote of his
Rodriguez dissent. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Of course,
nothing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state educational
funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.”).
44. See Thro, supra note 42, at 601-03.
45. With the caveat that we cannot draw a sharp distinction between some second- and
third-wave cases, see supra note 37 and accompanying text, these decisions of the highest
courts in twenty states are detailed infra in Table B.
46. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951-52 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill
(Horton I), 376 A.2d 359, 373-75 (Conn. 1977); Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va.
1979); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332-33 (Wyo. 1980).
47. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93-95 (Ark. 1983); Helena
Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State (Helena I), 769 P.2d 684, 690-91 (Mont. 1989); Robinson
v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273, 295-96 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585
P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978). I have included the Montana decision in the second wave even
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Nevertheless, the tide that brought in the second wave receded as
plaintiffs’ losses outnumbered their wins. Various explanations have
been offered for the ebb of the second wave, but essentially all share
the perception that courts struggled with adopting a version of
equality they would be willing and able to enforce.48
The remedy for unequal spending seemed deceptively simple at
first: formal equality through “either horizontal equity among school
districts, such that per-pupil revenues were roughly equalized by
the state, or at least fiscal neutrality, such that the revenues avail-
able to a school district would not depend solely on the property
wealth of the school district.”49 To achieve absolute fiscal equaliza-
tion, however, would require (1) leveling down educational spending
overall by capping expenditures in wealthy districts while recaptur-
ing and redistributing tax revenues to poorer districts, and/or (2)
leveling up through continual state tax increases to support guar-
anteed tax bases and supplemental aid to poorer districts to match
the spending in wealthy districts.50 Neither form of leveling was
sustainable politically,51 and leveling down is undesirable from
though others have classified it as a third-wave adequacy case. See, e.g., Thro, supra note 37,
at 233-34. I do so because the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint emphasized the wealth
disparities among school districts, and the court’s reasoning was based in substantial part on
those disparities being violative of the state constitution education clause which includes an
equal-protection-type guarantee: “[e]quality of educational opportunity.” Helena I, 769 P.2d
at 686 (citiing MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1); see Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Fi-
nance Litigation, and the “Third Wave”: From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151,
1163 (1995) (“Reasonable disagreement over the proper classification of Helena [I] exists,
although it probably does not justify a full-blown dispute ... [given] the opinion’s confluence
of equity and adequacy.”).
48. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 143-66 (1995) (suggesting that the education context robs
equity of its appealing simplicity); Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow
Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and
Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543, 579-85 (1998) (analyzing factors contributing to
equality theory’s demise); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 266-
68 (1999) (noting the limited relief even successful plaintiffs obtained); Kevin Randall
McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform
Litigation and the Courts’ Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867, 1873-74
(1998) (citing “political realities” and the difficulty in narrowly tailoring equality mandates
for the second wave’s failure).
49. Koski & Hahnel, supra note 39, at 47 (emphasis added).
50. See Enrich, supra note 48, at 156; see also Erin E. Buzuvis, “A” for Effort: Evaluating
Recent State Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 664-65 (2001).
51. See Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s,
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almost every perspective.52 Most relevant here, leveling down
constrains liberty by preventing parents from deciding collectively
to spend more on their children’s education,53 and by arresting the
development of talents and abilities “to the lowest common denomi-
nator,” thereby denying all children their full potential.54
As the second wave crested circa 1982, courts could not ignore the
mounting public opposition and legislative resistance to equalizing
tax capacity or expenditures and the leveling down of educational
spending in some states pursuing horizontal equity or fiscal neu-
trality.55 Before 1983, plaintiffs prevailed in six of fifteen states.56
Thereafter, until the end of the second wave in 1989, they secured
wins in just two of six challenges.57 Courts supplied various justif-
ications for upholding funding disparities or for deeming the right
to education nonjusticiable.58 Notably, however, the increasing
in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 136, 138 (Helen
F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999) (“No proposal to equalize education funding throughout a state by
decreasing expenditures down to the lowest level has ever been considered politically feas-
ible.”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 61 (1990) (“Limited state fiscal capacities and resistance to increased state
taxes constrain the scope of equalization programs, so that most equalization assistance
serves not to equalize but to raise the level of spending in poorer districts to some target
amount—usually at or below the median spending level in the state, and certainly not up to
the spending of the more affluent districts. The ‘levelling up’ component of state school aid
thus tends to level to the middle.”).
52. See William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 591 (2006) (“Leveling
down might increase equality of educational resources, but in the process it will significantly
impact the absolute quality of education provided, worsening the better off and failing to
improve the worse off.”).
53. “For many decades, Americans have regarded as a component of their political liberty
that they may participate as part of a local community in shaping that community’s educa-
tional system.” Aaron J. Saiger, Legislating Accountability: Standards, Sanctions, and School
District Reform, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1655, 1730 (2005) (citing KATHRYN A. MCDERMOTT,
CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALISM VERSUS EQUITY 13-14 (1999)); see also Briffault,
supra note 51, at 37-38 (observing that several state courts have rejected school finance
challenges “because of a concern that mandating greater interlocal equalization of fiscal
capacity would threaten local autonomy”).
54. Elizabeth Anderson, Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspec-
tive, 117 ETHICS 595, 615 (2007).
55. See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection:
The First Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1343, 1362-63 (2010).
56. See infra Table B.
57. See infra Table B.
58. For instance, they echoed Rodriguez’s reverence for local control, doubted the basic
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reluctance to accept equality-based challenges had little to do with
differences in the language of education clauses among the states,
or whether the state had a textual commitment to separation of
powers in its constitution.59 Nor did state courts diverge much from
federal doctrine or each other in how they interpreted state equal
protection guarantees.60
Rather, courts reversed field, because if they were to entertain the
merits of these cases and give effect to the right to education as an
“immunity against unequal treatment,”61 then that would compel
them to enforce politically infeasible and undesirable equalization
remedies that might conflict with individual liberties.
Political realities aside, the formal equality endorsed in the early
first- and second-wave cases was also inherently flawed for two
reasons. First, equalizing per pupil funding does not in itself
improve the quality of education; it “does not protect against
inadequate funding, provided that inadequacy is equally shared.”62
Second, formal equality fails to address the needs of disadvantaged
children, who enter “the schoolhouse door already on unequal
footing.”63 Equalizing per-pupil funding without directly addressing
those needs perpetuated inequalities.64 Disadvantaged children
“required not equal but more spending to even approximate the
educational opportunities and attainment of their peers.”65 Hence,
premise that money matters to educational outcomes, or invoked separation of powers and
political questions entailed by observing the legislature’s plenary power over education policy.
See Koski, supra note 37, at 1252-53; see also McMillan, supra note 48, at 1879-80 (concluding
as well that “state courts were hesitant to rely on their state constitutions’ equal protection
clauses for fear that the decision would open the door to massive amounts of equal protection
litigation from the broad spectrum of social institutions”).
59. See Bauries, supra note 27, at 713-15, 745 (discussing prior studies that failed to
establish a strong link between education clause language and school finance case outcomes
and conducting own study of explicit separation of powers provisions in state constitutions
before concluding that they too were not predictive).
60. See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Conver-
gence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 302-03 (2011) (discussing
scholarship noting “doctrinal convergence is the overwhelming majority approach among state
courts” construing equal protection guarantees).
61. Id. at 317.
62. Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Slaying the Inequality Villain in School Finance:
Is the Right to Education the Silver Bullet?, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 360 (2011).
63. Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at 503 & n.141.
64. See id.
65. Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 966. 
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formal equality was not just practically unenforceable, it subverted
the goal it was meant to achieve: equal educational opportunity.
That goal was not abandoned when courts turned to adequacy as
the predominant theory during the third wave.66 Yet rather than
persist with formal equality, “courts gradually began to articulate
a substantive brand of equal educational opportunity, conferring an
immunity against inequitable (as opposed to unequal) spending.”67
The aim was to direct more compensatory resources and services to
the neediest students to mitigate their disadvantages and progress
vertical equity.68 Such remedial measures are most often imple-
mented through weighted student funding formulas, which assign
weights to all students (for example, 1.0) but apportion additional
weights to certain student demographic categories that have more
expensive educational needs—for example, students participating
in federal free or reduced-lunch program (+0.4), students with dis-
abilities (+0.9), English-language learners (+0.5)—which is sup-
posed to result in schools with higher populations of these student
categories receiving more state funding.69 Through these more
equitable inputs, vertical equity measures attempt to achieve more
equitable outputs.70
66. See Koski & Hahnel, supra note 39, at 47.
67. Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 966.
68. See ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL
FINANCE: CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS 2-3, 35-40 (1984)
(conceptualizing “vertical equity” in school finance context as treating differently situated
students differently, that is, adjusting funding to the educational needs of students rather
than treating all students as if they are similarly situated, an implicit assumption of
horizontal equity).
69. See THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., FUND THE CHILD: TACKLING INEQUITY & ANTIQUITY IN
SCHOOL FINANCE 23-24 (2006), http://www.edexcellencemedia.net/publications/2006/200606_
fundthechild/FundtheChild062706.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6G6-NLPJ] (explaining the incen-
tive for schools to use weights based on student demographics to attract challenging student
populations and receive the related increases in funding); Karen Hawley Miles & Marguerite
Roza, Understanding Student-Weighted Allocation as a Means to Greater School Resource
Equity, 81 PEABODY J. EDUCATION 39, 53, 57 (2006) (explaining the use of weights based on
certain demographics for distribution of funding, and finding that “student-weighted alloca-
tion resulted in more schools receiving allocations near the district’s weighted average ex-
penditure and increased equity”). See generally Deborah A. Verstegen & Robert C. Knoeppel,
From Statehouse to Schoolhouse: Education Finance Apportionment Systems in the United
States, 38 J. EDUC. FIN. 145 (2012) (surveying information on states’ use of weights to
distribute funding according to different demographics of students).
70. See Robert Berne & Leanna Stiefel, Concepts of School Finance Equity: 1970 to the
Present, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 7, 20
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Improving vertical equity, then, serves to level the playing field
and give all children, in spite of their natural and social disadvan-
tages, an equal chance to succeed—which should not be confused
with a demand for equal success.71 Equal chance is itself a laudable
goal insofar as it is tempered by the reality that it cannot be fully
realized.72 That is, the goal “is not literally equal chances but ap-
proximately equal chances.”73 Nevertheless, to those who contend
that disadvantaged students “simply cannot make it, the constitu-
tional answer is, give them a chance.”74 Indeed, the notion that we
should at least mitigate disadvantages to give children a fairer
chance to succeed carries moral force and resonates politically, and
thus has enjoyed staying power.
So conceived, vertical equity is also conducive to the demands of
liberty, both negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom to).75
Allocating resources in a way that advances vertical equity does not
impinge negative liberty, namely the privilege of parents to control
(Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999). 
71. See Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at 485-86 & nn.33-35, 488-89, 495, 532
(discussing views on “equality of opportunity”).
72. Id. at 532-33 (explaining that equal chances “cannot be attained without completely
neutralizing all of the differential effects of social circumstances ... and natural endowments
... on every child’s chances for educational achievement”—an insatiable demand that cannot
be achieved completely without suppressing parental liberty and, because this guiding moral
principle is, in fact, infeasible, one that “violate[s] the maxim ‘ought implies can’”). 
73. Id. at 534. 
74. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990).
75. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121-22
(1969). Negative liberty refers to “the degree to which no man or body of men interferes with
my activity,” a freedom from external interference or obstruction. Id. at 122. Positive liberty
“consists in being one’s own master,” an internal freedom to be and do, that is, to self-direct
one’s life. Id. at 131. Scholars have contested this distinction, among them Gerald MacCallum,
who proposed that there is only one concept of liberty that involves a 
triadic relation—that is, a relation between three things: an agent, certain
preventing conditions, and certain doings or becomings of the agent. Any
statement about freedom or unfreedom can be translated into a statement of the
above form by specifying what is free or unfree, from what it is free or unfree,
and what it is free or unfree to do or become.
Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/
[https://perma.cc/AFQ5-8BRC]. Although MacCallum’s critique has been influential, “Berlin’s
distinction continues to dominate mainstream discussions about the meaning of political and
social freedom.” Id. For that reason, I employ the distinction here, with some reservations
about its usefulness. 
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their children’s education.76 Both individually and collectively,
through participation in local decision-making, parents retain cer-
tain freedoms from external interference, including “the freedom to
devote more money to the education of [their] children.”77 School
districts are free to exert such local control provided that the state
meets the needs of disadvantaged children through compensatory
resources and services.78 Whereas horizontal equity threatened to
encroach on local control by leveling down educational spending,
vertical equity requires leveling up to a certain threshold—not to
the very top but to the point that disadvantages below the threshold
are mitigated while positional advantages held by children above
the threshold are diminished. This is a more practical and politically
viable goal.
In furthering that goal, vertical equity also facilitates positive
liberty by providing disadvantaged children with the compensatory
resources needed to develop their capabilities, their internal free-
dom to be equal citizens and productive members of the economy.79
The importance of this positive sense of freedom, of possessing the
capabilities to actually achieve certain desired ends, has in fact been
the impulse behind the adequacy court decisions during the third
wave.
B. Equality-Enhancing Liberty Through “Educational Adequacy”
“Each child, every child, ... must be provided with an equal oppor-
tunity to have an adequate education.”80 So declared the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., a tide-
shifting decision that refocused school finance challenges on the
quality of education children should receive.81 The U.S. Supreme
Court punted on that question in Rodriguez, although it reserved
76. Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 930-31 (analyzing right to education as a
“qualified ‘privilege’” held by parents “subject to the exercise of state powers that bear
‘reasonable’ regulations”).
77. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973). 
78. See Enrich, supra note 48, at 112.
79. See Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at 529, 539-40.
80. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (emphasis
omitted and added).
81. Id.
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the possibility that there exists a right to “some identifiable
quantum of education” implicit in the U.S. Constitution.82 Ken-
tucky’s highest court, however, did not flinch, issuing a sweeping
decision that invalidated that state’s entire statutory school system
(not merely the financing but every statute relating to public
schools) on the grounds that it failed to deliver access to an ade-
quate education for all children as mandated by the state constitu-
tion’s education clause.83
The court did not just insist on adequacy but broadly outlined
what it would entail: an education that instills “seven ... capacities”
enabling children to, inter alia, “make informed choices” as respon-
sible citizens and “compete favorably” in higher education and in the
job market.84 Rose was arguably the first decision to firmly construe
the right to education as obligating the state to develop certain
capacities or capabilities in children.85 However, the link between
education and children’s capabilities (positive freedoms) long pre-
dated the storied 1989 decision. Indeed, in some instances, that link
was established at the dawn of the nation’s history, appearing in the
text of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century state constitutions
that conveyed the import of public education to democracy, a view
later endorsed by state courts even absent explicit language in the
text.86
The idea is that education allows children to acquire the capabili-
ties needed to meet the demands of citizenship, which is “essential
to the preservation of [their] rights and liberties,”87 and, in turn,
82. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
83. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213.
84. Id. at 212.
85. See Bauries, supra note 37, at 709-11, 709 n.39 (contending that, although Rose cited
favorably an earlier opinion by the West Virginia Supreme Court, see Rose 790 S.W. 2d at 209-
10 (citing Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979)), Rose was first to conceive of funda-
mental right to adequate education as a positive right, apart from equal protection analysis,
resulting in a “paradigm shift in conceptions of education rights”). But see Kern Alexander,
The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The Kentucky Case, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 355 (1991) (describing Pauley as finding a “positive mandate” in
education provision of West Virginia Constitution “sufficient to establish fundamentality”).
86. See Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 962 (citing relevant authorities).
87. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MO. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1(a); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; accord MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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“essential to self-government”88 and “a free society.”89 The state is
thereby “dependent for its survival on citizens who are able to par-
ticipate intelligently in the political, economic, and social functions
of our system.”90 In this way, the state’s duty to inculcate certain
capabilities “is designed not only to serve the interests of the child-
ren, but, more fundamentally, to prepare them to participate as free
citizens of a free State to meet the needs and interests of a republi-
can government.”91
State constitutions and courts likewise express that public edu-
cation is vital to meeting the state’s economic needs.92 Education
equips children with the capabilities “to attain productive employ-
ment and otherwise contribute to the state’s economy.”93 Enabling
children to “lead economically productive lives” therefore works “to
the benefit of us all.”94 In addition to “maintaining a citizenry
capable of furthering the economic, political, and social viability of
the State,”95 courts have underscored education’s role in “nurturing
children’s capabilities to be autonomous generally—through person-
al and moral development, mutual understanding, self-knowledge,
and the capacity to flourish in society.”96
Again and again, the theme running through state constitutions
and court interpretations thereof is that education is necessary
because it “imparts those ‘critically important’ skills needed to com-
pete in the labor market, and that bestows the capacity to function
as a citizen—as a contributing and participating member of society
88. Brigham v. State (Brigham I), 692 A.2d 384, 393 (Vt. 1997) (per curiam).
89. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812 (Ariz. 1994).
90. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
91. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 1993).
92. See Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 962-63 (citing relevant authorities).
93. Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 253 (Conn. 2010).
94. Op. of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 159 (Ala. 1993) (quoting favorably Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
95. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1356 (N.H. 1997).
96. See Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 963 & n.291 (citing relevant author-
ities). This connotes a rather thick conception of positive liberty. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg,
“He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a
Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 652 (1993) (“Positive liberty ... necessitates a
certain kind of education ... [that can] extricate the individual from the judgment-clouding
appetites and exigencies to which she is otherwise enslaved. Only by acquiring the capacity
to make intelligent choices does the individual become truly free.” (footnote omitted)).
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and one’s community.”97 This is reflective of the view that to be free
does not mean “merely to be left alone,” to have negative liberty; one
“must also have the capacity to realize the goals” one chooses for
one’s life (positive liberty).98
To be sure, no court has even so much as mentioned the term
positive liberty or freedom in relation to adequacy. At most, courts
have explicitly or implicitly acknowledged that, unlike the U.S.
Constitution, which is often described as “a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties,”99 nearly all “state constitutions
contain the textual basis for affirmative rights.”100 But courts have
not elaborated much on the affirmative nature of the right to ed-
ucation, undoubtedly because they are sympathetic to the criticism
that positive rights are difficult to enforce or are otherwise reluctant
to venture beyond the reassuringly familiar terrain of negative
rights.101 Moreover, state courts had a less controversial, more
textual foundation on which to ground adequacy—their state
97. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 428 (N.J. 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting
Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990)).
98. See ALAN WOLFE, THE FUTURE OF LIBERALISM 13 (2009); see also Jedediah Purdy, A
Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1237, 1263 (2005) (“Promoting a capabilities-oriented conception of freedom involves
both securing persons against interference and helping them toward the resources, institu-
tional context, and psychologically significant experiences that undergird ‘positive’ self-direc-
tion.”); Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 964 (observing that positive liberty or
freedom has been central to the “capability approach advanced by Amartya Sen and Martha
Nussbaum”).
99. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980)).
100. Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 370-71, 374 (Colo. 2009) (concluding that adequacy
challenge to school financing system was justiciable and subject to rational-basis review); see
also McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (Wash. 2012) (reaffirming that state constitution
“confers on children ... a positive constitutional right to an amply funded education”); Marga-
ret H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children”: Interpreting
State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633, 1643 (2004)
(former Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court describing state constitutions “[a]s
charters of ‘positive liberty’”).
101. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the
United States, 57 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1026 (1997) (“Our courts, through judicial review, are
accustomed to telling government what it may not do; they are not, by tradition or staffing,
well-equipped to map out elaborate programs detailing what government must do.”). See
generally Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001) (dis-
cussing the economic and political factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of positive
rights).
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constitutions’ education clauses, the very same clauses that had
previously underpinned equity claims in some states.102
Nearly all courts have construed these once-dormant clauses to
confer on children a claim-right to education, imposing on states a
correlative duty to educate.103 The positive dimension of this right
compelling affirmative state action is so discernable that state
courts conveniently did not have to elaborate further.104 Yet when
tasked to justify adequacy as the qualitative standard that the state
has to meet to discharge its duty, courts repeatedly returned to the
notion that education fortifies children’s positive liberties, though
again without utilizing the term positive liberty.105 In truth, courts
did not need to risk invoking “any fancy philosophical or newfangled
positive liberty”106 because the political winds had shifted decidedly
toward adequacy, which became synonymous not with liberty but
with educational quality.107
102. See Koski & Reich, supra note 52, at 559. Differences in the language of education
clauses among the states have not precluded courts from concluding that adequacy is
constitutionally mandated. See Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are
Redefining State Responsibility for Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 281, 291 (noting considerable variation in language of education clauses but
observing that “courts have held that whenever a state is required to establish and maintain
a public education system, regardless of the particular language used to describe it, it must
meet basic quality standards”); see also Koski & Hahnel, supra note 39, at 47; Thro, supra
note 37, at 225-32.
103. See Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 948-49, 949 nn.207, 209-12 (citing
cases).
104. The highest courts in just two states briefly noted the Hohfeldian claim-right nature
of the right to education. See McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 527
n.23 (Mass. 1993); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978). Otherwise,
the references to a positive or affirmative right to education have been scant or fleeting. See
Lobato, 218 P.3d at 370-71; Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d
206, 272 (Conn. 2010) (Schaller, J., concurring) (“It has long been established, based on the
express language of our constitution, that the education clause guarantees to citizens of this
state an affirmative right to a free public education.”); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1282-83
(Conn. 1996) (“The issue before us, therefore, is what specific meaning to attach to the protec-
tion ... contained in article first, § 20, in a case in which that protection is invoked as part of
the plaintiff schoolchildren’s fundamental affirmative right.”).
105. See supra notes 80-92.
106. Jeremy Waldron, Community and Property—For Those Who Have Neither, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 161, 180 (2009).
107. See Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under
State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 133 (1989) (asserting that certain state case law
is concerned with “education quality rather than equality” and “provides a mechanism for
implementation of the republican precept of education for self-government”); Thro, supra note
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Anticipating the crash of the second wave seven years before
Rose, the U.S. Department of Education tasked its School Finance
Project experts “to explore the concept of educational adequacy.”108
Around the same time, several comparative studies, including the
influential 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk, sounded an omin-
ous warning of a “rising tide of mediocrity” in public schools.109 They
highlight “a perceived crisis in the quality of education” in both
impoverished and wealthy school districts.110 By decade’s end,
President George H.W. Bush convened an education summit of the
nation’s governors to address the problem.111 Governors and leg-
islatures, then contending with second-wave equity suits and the
prospect of having to raise taxes or cap, recapture, or redistribute
revenue, were all too willing to instead divert attention to raising
academic standards and devising accountability schemes to improve
the quality of education.112 Courts and advocates were likewise
anxious “to tether reforms to educational expertise ... [which] began
to appear in visible form through the emergence of state educational
standards, usually accompanied by statewide performance tests.”113
Thus, a perfect storm of political expediency and urgency precipi-
tated the third wave of school finance litigation.
Adequacy was then billed as “the more achievable, but more mod-
est” alternative to equity.114 Rather than demand equalization of tax
capacity or expenditures across school districts, adequacy only re-
quired that each school district have enough funding so that all of
42, at 609 (characterizing the first set of adequacy cases, meaning third-wave cases, as
“quality suits”).
108. ESTHER TRON, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH & IMPROVEMENT,
ED226489, ADEQUATE EDUCATION: ISSUES IN ITS DEFINITION AND IMPLEMENTATION 3 (1982);
see also Arthur E. Wise, Educational Adequacy: A Concept in Search of Meaning, 8 J. EDUC.
FIN. 300, 313 (1983).
109. Nat’l Comm’n on Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education-
al Reform, 84 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 113, 113 (1983).
110. See Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 51, at 147.
111. MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, THE ROAD TO CHARLOTTESVILLE: THE 1989 EDUCATION SUMMIT
1 (1999).
112. See Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 51, at 147, 150.
113. Martha Minow, Just Education: An Essay for Frank Michelman, 39 TULSA L. REV. 547,
559-60 (2004).
114. Enrich, supra note 48, at 182; see also Heise, supra note 47, at 1168-76 (discussing the
factors prompting the shift from equity to adequacy).
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its students could achieve a minimum qualitative threshold.115
Hence, adequacy posed no threat of leveling down educational
spending. Indeed, the wealthy and politically powerful school
districts would remain free to spend more to provide a greater-than-
adequate education to their students.116 While preserving such
forms of local control, adequacy was supposed to address many of
the same concerns of fairness and opportunity that had motivated
the equality-based challenges.117 Yet unlike the first- and second-
wave suits, which compared funding between districts to judge the
distribution of educational opportunities, the third-wave adequacy
suit was supposed to compare funding against standards to judge
the quality of educational opportunities in each district.118
Rebranding the school finance lawsuit worked, for a time. From
1989 to 2006, plaintiffs prevailed in approximately 75 percent of ad-
equacy cases.119 “The hidden pitfall” of the adequacy suit, however,
has been delineating the quality standards.120 In this, adequacy can-
not claim a distinct advantage over equality. For just as first- and
second-wave courts struggled with adopting a version of equality
they could enforce,121 third-wave courts have grappled with defining
adequacy vis-à-vis standards that are judicially manageable.
Confronted with such a “conceptually difficult” task threatening to
115. Enrich, supra note 48, at 112.
116. See id. at 168-69 (noting that adequacy arguments avoid “concerns about negative
impacts on the better off”). “More cynically stated, the political and economic elite would not
have to fear that their privileged status would be challenged.” Koski, supra note 37, at 1233.
117. See Enrich, supra note 48, at 167; see also Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at
520.
118. See Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at 527 (“[I]n deciding whether students
X and Y have adequate educational resources, we do not judge how much of the resource X
has compared to Y but rather simply ask: do X and Y each have a sufficient amount of the
resource to satisfy some threshold?”).
119. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1483 n.73 (2007) [hereinafter Rebell, Poverty]. By
some estimates, the overall win ratio has reduced to roughly 67 percent in recent years, given
increasing resistance of state courts to adjudicate such claims. See Michael A. Rebell, The
Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 80-81 (2012).
“The post-recession data set is much smaller, but between 2008 and 2012, plaintiffs lost about
two-thirds of the time in high courts.” Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding
Cuts, Teacher Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U.
L. REV. 423, 451 (2017).
120. Koski & Reich, supra note 52, at 561; accord Enrich, supra note 48, at 170-72.
121. See supra Part I.A.
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“strain the institutional capacity” of the judiciary, some expected
that state courts would simply define a constitutionally adequate
education by reference to legislatively crafted academic standards
developed during the standards and testing movements of the late
1980s and 1990s.122 But courts defied those expectations. In nearly
all states where adequacy cases have been successful, courts have
ultimately taken it upon themselves to define adequacy and set the
constitutional standard.123
Two points to note here. First, the standards expressed in court
definitions of adequacy reinforce the notion that a quality education
is necessary to develop children’s capabilities, their positive liber-
ties.124 In this regard, some states either adopted the seven capabili-
ties from Rose125 or have specified others.126 Even in states where
courts have declined to list a particular set of capabilities, courts
have defined the standard broadly to emphasize that an adequate
education must enable children to be responsible citizens, productive
members of the economy, or autonomous individuals.127 Hence,
whether courts want to acknowledge it or not, children’s positive
liberty interests are underwriting educational adequacy standards.
122. See James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1223, 1223-24 (2008).
123. See id. at 1232-33. Nevertheless, courts have assessed “state academic standards as
a point of departure in determining the meaning of a constitutional education.” Black, supra
note 55, at 1364-65, 1365 n.97 (citing cases).
124. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
125. E.g., Gannon I, 319 P.3d 1196, 1236 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359
(N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997).
126. See, e.g., Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (defining
“minimally adequate education” as “the opportunity to acquire: 1) the ability to read, write,
and speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science; 2) a
fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of history and govern-
mental processes; and 3) academic and vocational skills”).
127. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 227
(Conn. 2010) (defining a constitutionally adequate education as one that gives children “the
opportunity to be responsible citizens” and “prepare[s] them to progress to institutions of
higher education, or to attain productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state’s
economy”); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter (McWherter I), 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-51 (Tenn.
1993) (requiring “a system of free public schools” to provide “the opportunity to acquire
general knowledge, develop the powers of reasoning and judgment, and generally prepare
students intellectually for a mature life”); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94
(Wash. 1978) (concluding that education must prepare children, inter alia, “to be able to
inquire, to study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and understanding”).
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Second, while progressing children’s positive liberty interests, the
adequacy standards also augment their equality interests. For “if
adequacy requires getting all students above a certain threshold, it
will tend to focus disproportionate resources on [disadvantaged]
students” so that they can actually meet that threshold.128 In this
regard, adequacy is vertical equity by a different name.129 In fact,
several adequacy court decisions have approved of vertical-equity-
type funding “to compensate for differences in regional costs and
student needs that translate into higher costs to supply the same
quality of education throughout the state.”130 Moreover, courts and
legislatures have imported vertical-equity principles in utilizing the
methods for “costing-out an adequate education, that is, attaching
a price tag to the resources necessary for all children to reach speci-
fied educational outcomes.”131
Adequacy is also meant to be equality enhancing in its promotion
of “democratic equality”132 or “equal citizenship.”133 On this view,
inequality is objectionable not necessarily because disparities in
resources or opportunities exist but because of the potential for the
better-off to use such disparities to subjugate the worst off political-
ly, economically, and socially.134 For adequacy theorists, then, the
egalitarian aim is relational equality: to assure not that children
have the same educational resources and opportunities, but that all
children have enough to avoid oppression and function as equal
128. Kenneth A. Strike, Equality of Opportunity and School Finance: A Commentary on
Ladd, Satz, and Brighouse and Swift, 3 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 467, 476 (2008); see Ryan &
Saunders, supra note 37, at 469 (“The line between adequacy and equity becomes especially
hazy when a court acknowledges that underprivileged children may need more resources to
succeed than other children.”).
129. See generally Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 493 (1995) (discussing the convergence of adequacy and vertical equity).
130. Umpstead, supra note 102, at 298; see also Briffault, supra note 37, at 38 (describing
this version of adequacy as “equity plus” which “focuse[s] on the need for school financing
systems to provide more than equal funding to certain groups of schoolchildren ... in order for
those children to receive a truly adequate education”).
131. See William S. Koski, Achieving “Adequacy” in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 13, 21-23 (2007).
132. See Elizabeth Anderson, Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality
Perspective, 117 ETHICS 595, 596 (2007).
133. See Debra Satz, Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship, 117 ETHICS 623,
635-36 (2007).
134. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 312 (1999).
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citizens.135 To be sure, equal citizenship requires political and civil
equality, traditional negative liberties. But social equality—made
possible through the exercise of positive liberties—is also “essential
to being regarded by oneself and by others as a full member of one’s
society.”136 Consequently, the adequacy threshold “must be suffi-
ciently high to ensure not bare subsistence, but the achievement of
the full range of human capabilities that constitute the societal
norm.”137 This means the adequacy threshold also “must be dynam-
ic, evolving as societal norms evolve.”138 And it must be relational
“because what it takes to be an equal citizen—that is, where to set
the adequacy threshold—invariably turns on what educational re-
sources others have.”139
That adequacy standards must be dynamic and relational helps
explain why courts have made comparative assessments of the edu-
cational resources between districts, just as they did in their first-
and second-wave decisions.140 Indeed, courts do not “enforce some
absolute notion of adequacy, where disparities in resources are ig-
nored.”141 Rather, disparities between districts are tolerable until
“they undermine the ability of students to function as equal citizens
and compete for admission to higher education and high-quality jobs
on comparable terms—that is, undermine democratic equality.”142
135. See id. at 320.
136. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 342
(2006).
137. Id. at 347; see also R.H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY 168 (George Allen & Unwind Ltd. 1964)
(“[W]hen liberty is construed, realistically, or implying, not merely a minimum of civil and po-
litical rights, but securities that the economically weak will not be at the mercy of the econom-
ically strong, ... a large measure of equality, so far from being inimical to liberty, is essential
to it.”); Wilson, supra note 15, at 194 (“In its positive aspect liberty has much in common with
equality. Both are oriented toward the positive promotion of those conditions necessary for
full and equal enjoyment of the fruits of social organization.”).
138. Liu, supra note 136, at 347; accord Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (“A
constitutionally adequate public education is not a static concept removed from the demands
of an evolving world.... A broad exposure to the social, economic, scientific, technological, and
political realities of today’s society is essential for our students to compete, contribute, and
flourish in the twenty-first century.”).
139. Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at 527.
140. See Ryan, supra note 122, at 1237-38.
141. Id. at 1237 (concluding that adequacy as a dynamic standard compels “the state to
achieve greater comparability between wealthy and poor districts” when disparities in
opportunities become “intolerable”).
142. Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at 537.
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Surveying decades of school finance decisions reveals there is not
much space left between equality and adequacy. While mutually
exclusive in their theoretical extremes, courts have moderated these
demands to account for political and practical feasibility concerns
and have thereby construed them to be mutually reinforcing.143
More and more, claims under state constitutional rights to educa-
tion have come to demand “an adequately equal and equally ade-
quate education.”144 This is not a mere play on words.
The claim is for adequately equal educational opportunities aimed
at ensuring approximately, not strictly, equal chances for education-
al success—achieved through vertical rather than horizontal equity.
This form of equality is conducive to the positive and negative
demands of liberty. The claim is also one for an equally adequate
education in that all children should have access to a quality
education—achieved “through high adequacy thresholds sensitive
to children’s capabilities [positive liberties] to function as equal
citizens and to compete for admission to higher education and for
high-quality jobs.”145 This positive form of liberty is equality enhanc-
ing, fostering a relational, democratic equality through equal
citizenship.
It is, in short, a claim for equal liberty.146
II. FROM ONE MEANS-ENDS REVIEW TO ANOTHER
As the equal liberty claim under the right to education became
more distinct, the standard of review became more elusive. Courts
initially applied the means-ends test embodied in the tiers of
scrutiny, though often in unconventional ways.147 Gradually, near-
ly all abandoned heightened scrutiny and the tiers of scrutiny
143. See id. at 480, 483, 523-24.
144. Id. at 483.
145. Id. at 543.
146. As used in this Article, a legal claim for “equal liberty” implicates the rightholder’s
equality and liberty interests. By employing a term frequently associated with Rawls and his
first principle of justice, “equal basic liberties,” I do not mean to imply an ordering of the two
interests in the way that Rawls first principle is lexically prior to his second principle of jus-
tice, “fair equality of opportunity.” See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14, 220 (rev. ed.
1999).
147. See infra Part II.A.
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altogether.148 Now typically, as in Obergefell, no standard of review
for constitutionality is even announced.149 Without saying so explic-
itly, state courts continue to employ a means-ends test, though one
that does not comport with federal doctrine.150 State courts have
instead scrutinized the achievement of the constitutional ends while
deferring completely to legislatures regarding the means.151 Altern-
atively, courts have decided at minimum on the reasonableness of
the fit between the legislative means and the constitutional ends.152
The resulting ends-to-fit review, while more accommodating to the
positive claim-right form of the right to education, has not fully
advanced the right’s function to protect children from the harms of
educational disparities.
A. The Collapse of Tiered Means-Ends Review
The standard of review did not elude state courts during the first
wave of school finance litigation. Supreme Court precedent com-
pelled those courts entertaining claims brought under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the tiers
of scrutiny.153 As shown in Table A below, the highest courts in Cali-
fornia and Michigan, and a New Jersey trial court, all deemed the
right to education fundamental; thus, strict scrutiny was in order.154
The California and Michigan courts also applied strict scrutiny
because they deemed wealth a suspect class, adhering closely to
148. See infra Part II.A.
149. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
150. See infra Part II.B.
151. See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
153. Indeed, these first-wave decisions came on the heels of the Supreme Court having just
articulated “the test of strict scrutiny for infringements of fundamental rights.” Mario L.
Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L.
REV. 1059, 1078 (2011) (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)).
154. I have included the New Jersey trial court decision because there were very few state
court decisions during the first wave. Nevertheless, I have omitted state trial court and
intermediate appellate court decisions from Tables B and C, infra, because there were ample
second- and third-wave decisions issued by the highest courts in the various states. Federal
courts issued the other notable first-wave decisions. See Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068
(D. Md. 1972); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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language of then-recent Supreme Court precedent.155 Yet cracks
appeared in the tiers of scrutiny when the New Jersey trial court
did not specify a standard of review in concluding that the school
financing statute was violative of the state constitution’s education
clause.156
155. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (Cal. 1971) (first citing Harper
v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); and then citing McDonald v. Bd. of
Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)); Milliken v. Green (Milliken I), 203 N.W.2d 457,
469-70 (Mich. 1972) (same).
156. See Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (“It is clear
from findings made earlier that a ‘thorough’ education is not being afforded to all pupils in
New Jersey.... [T]he minimum support aid and save harmless provisions cannot be reconciled
at this time with the command of the Education Clause [to ‘provide for the maintenance and
support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools.’ N.J. Const. Art. VIII, § 4]”),
modified, Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
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Strict Scrutiny N/A Yes Plaintiffs
* “N/A” (Not Applicable) means that the plaintiffs did not assert the claim, legal theory, or
constitutional provision and/or that the court did rely on the claim, legal theory, or constitu-
tional provision in rendering its decision. 
** “Unspecified” means that the court apparently relied on the claim, legal theory, or
constitutional provision for its decision but failed to specify with sufficient clarity the applic-
able constitutional standard of review.
On review, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Robinson I,
ushering in the second wave and widening the cracks in tiers of
scrutiny.157 Just thirteen days before, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Rodriguez declined to recognize either a fundamental right to edu-
cation or wealth as a suspect class under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause and, thus, applied rational basis
review to uphold funding disparities.158 Perhaps anticipating the
outcome in Rodriguez, and with much of the opinion in Robinson I
already written, the New Jersey Supreme Court took issue with
federal equal protection analysis, disapproving as unhelpful “the
concept of a ‘fundamental’ right” and a “compelling” state interest.159
“Mechanical approaches to the delicate problem of judicial interven-
tion,” it contended, “only divert a court from the meritorious issue
157. See infra Table B.
158. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35, 40, 44 (1973).
159. See Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 282.
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or delay consideration of it.”160 While rejecting the formalistic nature
of the tiers of scrutiny, the court was also plainly concerned that en-
forcing equal protection as an immunity against unequal treatment
would require strict horizontal equity, a remedy it was unwilling to
endorse.161 Hence, the court swore off equal protection analysis
entirely, opting instead to consider whether school funding dispari-
ties violated the state constitution’s education clause.162 In so doing,
the court crafted its own standard of review:
Ultimately, a court must weigh the nature of the restraint or the
denial against the apparent public justification, and decide
whether the State action is arbitrary. In that process, if the cir-
cumstances sensibly so require, the court may call upon the
State to demonstrate the existence of a sufficient public need for
the restraint or the denial.163
It cannot be said, however, that the court rigorously applied this
new standard in reaching its decision. Rather, it merely agreed with
the trial court’s finding that the education clause “had not been met”
based on “discrepancies in dollar input per pupil” and with “no other
viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional
mandate” having been shown.164 Significantly, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court put more focus on “the end product”—that is, whether
the facts demonstrated compliance with the constitutional command
of “a thorough and efficient system of free public schools.”165
The Oregon Supreme Court later adopted the Robinson I
standard of review, which it characterized as a “balancing test.”166
“Under this approach the court weighs the detriment to the edu-
cation of the children of certain districts against the ostensible
160. Id.
161. See id. at 284 (“[W]e stress how difficult it would be to find an objective basis to say
the equal protection clause selects education and demands inflexible statewide uniformity in
expenditure.”); see also id. at 297-98 (cautioning not to interpret its decision “to mean that the
State may not recognize differences in area costs, or a need for additional dollar input to equip
classes of disadvantaged children for the educational opportunity”).
162. See id. at 287-88.
163. Id. at 282.
164. Id. at 295.
165. Id. at 294 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4).
166. Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 145 (Or. 1976).
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justification for the scheme of school financing.”167 But aside from
that lone Oregon decision, which actually upheld funding dispari-
ties,168 the Robinson I balancing test never caught on. In fact, the
New Jersey Supreme Court itself never put the test to actual use in
subsequent school finance challenges, referencing it just once more
at the beginning of the long-running series of Abbott cases.169
Still, Robinson I, being the first post-Rodriguez second-wave
decision, provided a template for how other state courts could apply
the education clauses in their state constitutions. For example, the
Idaho Supreme Court agreed with Robinson I in refusing to categor-
ize the right to education as “‘fundamental’ versus ‘nonfundamen-
tal.’”170 And, the majority of second- and third-wave courts, like
Robinson I, refused to decide whether the right to education is
fundamental.171 Although the balancing test was never fully
utilized, Robinson I showed enough daylight through the cracks in
the tiers of scrutiny to suggest to other courts that they too could
alter their standards of review. The Connecticut Supreme Court, for
instance, agreed with Robinson I’s rejection of the “formalistic
reliance on the usual standards of the law of equal protection” and
therefore modified its test for strict scrutiny.172 Conversely, Robin-
son I may have emboldened most second-wave courts simply to
decline to specify any standard of review when analyzing education
clause claims, as shown in Table B.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 149.
169. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985) (observing “a balancing
test is employed to determine whether a claimed deprivation of personal rights violates” the
equal protection provisions of the New Jersey Constitution and noting that “[i]n striking the
balance, a court must consider ‘the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the gov-
ernmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction’” (quoting
Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985))).
170. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 646 (Idaho 1975).
171. See infra Tables B and C.
172. See Horton v. Meskill (Horton II), 486 A.2d 1099, 1105-06 (Conn. 1985) (adopting a
“three-step process” for strict scrutiny: (1) “a prima facie showing that disparities in educa-
tional expenditures are more than de minimis”; (2) if so, “the burden then shifts to the state
to justify these disparities as incident to the advancement of a legitimate state policy”; and
(3) if so, “the state must further demonstrate that the continuing disparities are nevertheless
not so great as to be unconstitutional”).
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On a separate track, it looked as though Robinson I might also
affect how courts would approach equal protection claims under
state constitutions.173 Then, the California Supreme Court followed
up Serrano I, its first-wave decision, with Serrano II, its influential
173. Two of the next four decisions remained undecided on the fundamental rights ques-
tion, and the other two applied rational basis review regardless of their answer to that
question. See supra Table B.
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second-wave decision. Although no longer bound by federal prece-
dent in considering a claim under the equal protection provisions of
the California Constitution, the court emulated federal doctrine
anyway in holding that a suspect “classification based upon [school]
district wealth which affects the fundamental interest of education,
must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”174
Following Serrano II, several second-wave courts also kept in
lockstep with federal equal protection analysis, applying strict scru-
tiny when deeming the right to education fundamental175 and ra-
tional basis review when deeming the right nonfundamental.176
Serrano II thus seemed to have a modest stabilizing effect on the
standard of review, at least for state equal protection claims. Yet the
fact that a majority of second-wave courts resorted to rational basis
review—even after deciding that the right to education is fundamen-
tal or remaining undecided on that question—indicates serious
reservations with heightened scrutiny generally.177 By the early
1970s, courts understood that federal equal protection analysis im-
plicating strict scrutiny “was ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”178 In
the education context, it was fatal politically and practically be-
cause, again, courts initially believed that enforcing equal protection
as immunity against unequal treatment meant they had to embrace
horizontal equity as the remedy.179 Courts that applied rational
174. Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929, 952 (Cal. 1976).
175. See Horton I, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.
Va. 1979); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980).
176. See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ga. 1981); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d
758, 789-90 (Md. 1983); Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d
359, 365 (N.Y. 1982).
177. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1153 (1999) (“The prevalent understanding of
rationality review—and its most potent criticism—posits that rationality review is not review
at all, but rather the withholding of review, indicating a refusal to expend resources on issues
that the judiciary locates outside the constitutional domain.”).
178. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 797 (2006) (“While it remains true
that the majority of laws subjected to strict scrutiny fall and that the government typically
faces an onerous task defending laws under this standard, strict scrutiny is not nearly as
deadly as generations of lawyers have been taught.”).
179. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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basis review in upholding funding disparities expressed their
unease with horizontal equity differently, yet all perceived equaliza-
tion as an affront to liberty vis-à-vis local control of school dis-
tricts.180
As advocates and courts turned away from state equal protection
claims in the third wave, most courts ditched the tiers of scrutiny
altogether.181 The initial third-wave decision, Rose, set the tone.182
The Kentucky Supreme Court did not specify a standard in conclud-
ing that the state’s school system was unconstitutional.183 The court
purportedly gave “deference and weight to [legislative] enactments,”
before finding them “constitutionally deficient.”184 But aside from
this perfunctory nod to the legislature, it offered no other bench-
marks.185 The court summarily explained that it was “dutifully”
180. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592-93 (Ariz. 1973) (“We perceive no justifi-
cation for such a severe denegration [sic] of local property taxation and control .... We find no
magic in the fact that the school district taxes herein complained of are greater in some
districts than others.” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54
(1973))); Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1023 (“[W]e find no discrimination, invidious or otherwise, in a
system that applies a uniform subsidy formula on a statewide basis, while concurrently
promoting community control by means of local taxation.”); McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 167-68
(“[T]he Georgia public school finance system preserves the idea of local [control] .... The fact
that the state has not funded a large-scale equalization plan does not render the current
public school finance system invidiously discriminatory.”); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d
635, 652 (Idaho 1975) (“A general and uniform system ... which, within reasonable constitu-
tional limits of equality, makes ample provision for the education of all children, cannot be
based upon exact equality of funding per child because it takes more money in some districts
per child to provide about the same level of educational opportunity than it does in others.”);
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 368 (“It is significant that this constitutional language ... makes no
reference to any requirement that the education to be made available be equal or substan-
tially equivalent in every district. Nor is there any provision ... that local control of education
... be abolished.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 822 (Ohio 1979) (“[A]lthough the
Ohio system of school financing is built upon the principle of local control, resulting in
unequal expenditures between children who live in different school districts, we cannot say
that such disparity is a product of a system that is so irrational as to be an unconstitutional
violation of the Equal Protection and Benefit Clause.”); see also Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 788-89
(citing with approval the reasoning of Lujan and Nyquist). But see Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989) (upholding the system because it “delineates state distribution
of resources on an equal per-pupil basis” and rejecting the argument that equal protection
requires “the state to distribute resources unequally among students to respond to the partic-
ularized needs of each student”).
181. See infra Table C.
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applying “the constitutional test” of the education clause, but alas,
no test or standard of review appears in that one-sentence clause.186
Yet the court, having considered “the evidence in the record” against
the “constitutional requirement” of the education clause, concluded
it was “crystal clear” that the legislature had “fallen short of its
duty.”187
It was also immediately evident just a few years after Rose that
other state courts had indeed “shifted away” from the tiers of scruti-
ny and “toward the substance of a state’s education clause,” without
specifying an alternate standard of review.188 That pattern held
steady for the majority of third-wave courts, as shown in Table C.189
186. Id. at 189-90 (citing KY. CONST. § 183 (requiring the legislature to “provide for an effi-
cient system of common schools”)).
187. Id. at 189.
188. See Underwood, supra note 129, at 510 & n.98.
189. Excluded from the analysis of third-wave decisions are the seven states that declined
to entertain the merits of school finance litigation, reasoning that their state constitution
education clauses vested discretion and plenary power in the legislature. See Ex parte James,
836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002) (per curiam); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding,
Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 406-08 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam); Comm. for Educ. Rights v.
Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190 (Ill. 1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v.
Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 158 P.3d 1058, 1065-
66 (Okla. 2007); Marrero v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113-14 (Pa. 1999); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 56 (R.I. 1995). In three of these cases, courts did entertain
challenges under state equal protection clauses but, finding no fundamental interests nor
suspect classification, applied rational basis review and concluded that the school financing
scheme was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1194-
96; Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 62; cf. Okla. Educ. Ass’n, 158 P.3d at 1066 (“[T]he only justiciable
question is whether the Legislature acted within its powers.” (quoting Fair Sch. Fin. Council
of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150 (Okla. 1987))).
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The tiers of scrutiny were ill-suited for enforcing the positive form
of the right to education. It was not just that rational basis review
provided “too little relief,” while strict scrutiny provided “too much,”
as is so often the case.190 It was that they did not accommodate the
new form that the right to education assumed in the third wave.
State courts began formulating the right not (merely) as an immun-
190. See Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 439 (2000).
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ity against unequal funding but as a claim-right to an adequate
education.191
Adjudicating the right to education as an immunity has required
courts to analyze whether the legislature’s school financing scheme
exceeded the limits imposed by state equal protection guarantees.
The issue there is whether the funding distributions resulted in un-
equal treatment.192 If so, the immunity thwarts state action, in
effect disabling the legislature’s power to enact its chosen funding
formula.193 Hence, as the Washington Supreme Court explains, “The
role of the court is to police the outer limits of government power,
relying on the constitutional enumeration of negative rights to set
the boundaries.”194 For that purpose, the tiers of scrutiny, though
flawed, can restrain state action that is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest or not narrowly tailored to meet a compel-
ling state interest.
The tiers of scrutiny are inapposite, however, for adjudicating a
claim-right that compels, rather than restrains, state action. Again
the Washington Supreme Court explains that the “typical [negative
rights] inquiry whether the State has overstepped its bounds there-
fore does little to further the important normative goals expressed
in positive rights provisions.”195 For that purpose, rational basis
review is too deferential to legislative prerogatives, given its “strong
presumption of constitutionality” attendant to countermajoritarian,
finality, and federalism concerns.196 Such concerns, as Helen
Hershkoff persuasively argues, are misplaced in state court because
state judges are often elected, and thus, more politically account-
able.197 State constitutions are more easily amended, and thus state
court decisions are less final.198 And, in the absence of federalism
191. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
192. See Bauries, supra note 60, at 330 (citing Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1977)).
193. See id.
194. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 248 (Wash. 2012) (citing Hershkoff, supra note 177,
at 1137).
195. Id. at 248 (“[The negative rights] approach ultimately provides the wrong lens for
analyzing positive constitutional rights, where the court is concerned not with whether the
State has done too much, but with whether the State has done enough.”); accord Areto A.
Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide Public Education, 22 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 87-88 (2011).
196. See Hershkoff, supra note 177, at 1157-69.
197. See id. at 1157-58.
198. See id. at 1162-63.
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concerns, state courts are well-positioned to devise remedies respon-
sive to local issues.199 Utmost deference to the legislature is also
antithetical with the propensity of state courts to exert judicial
authority to conduct “independent examinations of educational
quality” and craft “their own substantive [adequacy] standards.”200
Strict scrutiny is problematic in the opposite direction, against
legislative action. That test has served different purposes, function-
ing as a near “categorical prohibition against infringements of fun-
damental rights,” curtailing unjustified “intrusion[s] on protected
liberties,” and defining “constitutional rights as rights not to be
harmed by governmental acts taken for forbidden purposes.”201 The
common purpose, however, is to restrain state action from imping-
ing rights. Narrow tailoring serves that purpose by insisting “that
infringements of protected rights must be necessary in order to be
justified.”202 Likewise, the compelling state interest requirement
serves the state-limiting purpose by seeking “to prevent the grave
assault to individual rights that occurs when government action
trammels those rights to achieve goals directly inconsistent with the
Constitution.”203 The purpose and components of strict scrutiny
therefore seem incompatible with the aim of positive claim-right
enforcement—which is not to restrain but to compel state action
when it furthers the interests protected by those rights.204
199. See id. at 1167-69. Because these concerns are misplaced, Hershkoff contends that
federal rationality review is a poor “fit with the institutional and substantive position of state
courts adjudicating state constitutional welfare claims.” Id. at 1154; see also Burt Neuborne,
Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893
(1989).
200. See Cochran, supra note 190, at 439; cf. Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of
Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1651 (2016) (“Rationality permits a considerable
amount of both over- and under-inclusiveness.”).
201. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1302-03
(2007).
202. Id. at 1326 (“The Supreme Court sometimes expresses essentially the same demand
when it says that the government’s chosen means must be ‘the least restrictive alternative’
that would achieve its goals. A law would not be necessary to achieve its ends if the govern-
ment could accomplish the same result while inflicting lesser burdens on protected rights.”
(quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004)).
203. Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 299
(2015).
204. Roy Spece has proposed to me that strict scrutiny could be adapted for positive rights
enforcement (“When government inaction trammels fundamental rights, strict scrutiny should
apply.”). It is telling, however, that state courts have declined to adapt the standard in ade-
quacy decisions. Perhaps that speaks more to the dual forms that the right to education has
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This mismatch is reflected in third-wave adequacy decisions that
did not apply strict scrutiny even when the right to education was
deemed fundamental,205 and in decisions that supposedly applied
strict scrutiny but nevertheless upheld alleged funding inadequa-
cies.206 It may also explain why, for instance, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court neglected to apply the narrow tailoring or compel-
ling state interest requirements, even though it announced strict
scrutiny as the test for determining adequacy under its education
clause.207 Instead, the court simply concluded that the state financ-
ing system imposed “unreasonable and inequitable tax burdens” on
local districts.208
The incompatibility of strict scrutiny with positive claim-right en-
forcement is nowhere more apparent than in the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s third-wave decisions. Initially, the court held that it would
“review any legislative school financing reform with strict scrutiny
to determine whether the evil of financial disparity, from whatever
unjustifiable cause, has been exorcized from the Wyoming educa-
tional system.”209 The court further explained that, although strict
scrutiny was originally adopted for resolving a second-wave equal
protection case, it would “extend that decision beyond a wealth-
based disparity to other types of causes of disparities,” presumably
including those caused by inadequate (as opposed to inequitable)
funding.210
Notably, the Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged the positive
form of the right to education and that its “duty to protect individual
rights includes compelling legislative action required by the consti-
taken over the years, see Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 922, than to the potential
elasticity of strict scrutiny.
205. See Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 210-12 (Conn.
2010); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206, 209 (Ky. 1989); Hoke Cty.
Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke I), 599 S.E.2d 365, 374 (N.C. 2004); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256-57 (N.D. 1994); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 246, 248
(Wash. 2012).
206. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443
S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994).
207. See Claremont II, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358-59 (N.H. 1997).
208. Id. at 1360.
209. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State (Campbell I), 907 P.2d 1238, 1266 (Wyo. 1995) (em-
phasis added) (citing Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 335 (Wyo.
1980)).
210. Id.
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tution.”211 At the same time, the court also seemingly understood
that strict scrutiny review was geared toward negative rights en-
forcement, meant to restrain “state action interfering” with the
fundamental “right to an equal opportunity to a proper public edu-
cation.”212 And yet, as noted in Table C, the court made no distinc-
tion between equity and adequacy challenges in adopting strict
scrutiny as the test that would apply “to legislative action which
affects a child’s right to a proper education.”213
In follow-on suits, however, when the constitutional theory
sounded more in adequacy than in equity, the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s application of strict scrutiny was less exacting. The court
continued to regard strict scrutiny as “appropriate” for claims affect-
ing “the constitutional right to an equal and adequate education.”214
But in analyzing adequacy challenges, the court’s language was
more lax: “We are now faced with the difficult and unwelcomed task
of determining whether the funding adopted by the legislature ...
meets the constitutional standard of the ‘best we can do.’”215
Entertaining a petition for rehearing on the adequacy of school
capital construction, the court made no mention of the standard of
review, but did reiterate its judicial authority to use “provisional
remedies or other equitable powers intended to spur [legislative]
action.”216
Eventually, seven years later, the court had to clarify that, in fact,
“the strict scrutiny test ... [was] not in play” when it determined
whether the state had complied with previous rulings to adequately
211. Id. at 1264.
212. See id. at 1266 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1266-67 (“Such state action will not
be entitled to the usual presumption of validity; rather, the state must establish its inter-
ference with that right is forced by some compelling state interest and its interference is the
least onerous means of accomplishing that objective.” (citing Miller v. City of Laramie, 880
P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo. 1994))).
213. See id. at 1267 (emphasis added).
214. See State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. (Campbell II), 19 P.3d 518, 536 (Wyo. 2001).
215. Id. at 538 (quoting Campbell I, 907 P.2d at 1279); see also id. at 540 (considering
“whether the contested components” such as teacher salaries, transportation and special edu-
cation, and adjustments for student characteristics, “accurately reflect the cost a school
district should incur to provide that component”).
216. See State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. (Campbell III), 32 P.3d 325, 332 (Wyo. 2001)
(citing Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1072, 1086 (1991)).
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fund public education.217 That determination, the court explained,
“involves factual findings concerning whether the funding is ade-
quate to allow school districts to provide the education deemed
appropriate.”218 Such a bare bones means-ends test typified the
gradual approach of several third-wave courts—a more significant
and perhaps unexpected development than the collapse of the tiers
of scrutiny.
B. The Rise of Ends-to-Fit Review
Over the three waves, state courts that declined to specify a
standard of review for education clause claims ultimately assessed
whether the legislature did enough (means) to provide a constitu-
tionally adequate education (end).219 Frequently, they engaged in
this basic means-end scrutiny with the benefit of trial court factual
findings, entitled to a deferential “substantial evidence”220 or
“clearly erroneous”221 standard of review. The trial court’s conclu-
sions of law, however, received “no particular deference.”222 And although
217. See Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State (Campbell IV), 181 P.3d 43, 50 (Wyo. 2008).
218. See id. at 51.
219. See, e.g., Helena I, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989) (“We conclude that as a result of the
failure to adequately fund the Foundation Program, ... the State has failed to provide a system
of quality public education granting to each student the equality of educational opportunity
guaranteed under [the state education clause].”); Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 211 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (concluding that “the minimum support aid and save harmless
provisions” of financing system failed to satisfy “the command of the Education Clause” to
provide all children with “a ‘thorough’ education”), modified, Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.
1973); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 775 (Ohio 1997) (“The trial court’s find-
ings of fact document that the appellant school districts and other districts throughout this
state are starved for funds.... [I]t is obvious that the General Assembly has failed in its consti-
tutional obligation to ensure a thorough and efficient system of common schools.”); Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 97 (Wash. 1978) (“Thus we hold, compliance with [the
state education clause] can be achieved only if sufficient funds are derived ... to permit school
districts to provide ‘basic education’ through a basic program of education in a ‘general and
uniform system of public schools.’” (quoting WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2)).
220. See, e.g., Gannon I, 319 P.3d 1196, 1246 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam); Neeley v. W.
Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 790 (Tex. 2005); McCleary v. State,
269 P.3d 227, 253 (Wash. 2012).
221. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 196 (Ky. 1989); Campbell IV,
181 P.3d at 51.
222. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott VII), 971 A.2d 989, 992 n.2 (N.J. 2009) (quoting State v. Chun,
943 A.2d 114, 137 (N.J. 2008)); accord Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 785 (“To the extent that [the
constitutionality] determination rests on factual matters that are in dispute, we must, of
course, rely entirely on the district court’s findings. But in deciding ultimately the constitu-
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some courts began their analysis with a presumption that the
statutory financing scheme is constitutional,223 those courts showed
little reservation in concluding the presumption rebutted.224
That a means-end test has been the fallback for state courts
reaching conclusions of law on education clause claims is not sur-
prising as it “may well be the most frequently invoked technique in
the judicial review of the validity of federal and state legislation.”225
What is unusual is the way that state courts have employed this
technique. Means-end review is supposed to entail judicial scrutiny
of (1) the legislative means, (2) the legislative or constitutional ends,
and (3) the fit between the means and the ends.226 Under federal
doctrine, much of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, particu-
larly in equal protection cases, adheres to the view that courts
should scrutinize “the means chosen by the government to pursue
its ends, rather than ... the validity of the ends themselves.”227 And,
tional issues, those findings have a limited role.” (citing Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d
560, 582 (Tex. 1999); Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925
S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tex. 1996); Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 520
(Tex. 1968))); McCleary, 269 P.3d at 246 (“We review de novo the trial court’s conclusions of
law, including its interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions.”).
223. See Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 431-32 (N.J. 1997) (“We do not discount or minimize the
State’s contention that ... a legislative enactment ... is entitled to a presumption of validity.”);
DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 737 (“We are aware that the General Assembly has the
responsibility to enact legislation and that such legislation is presumptively valid. However,
this does not mean that we may turn a deaf ear to any challenge to laws passed by the
General Assembly.” (internal citations omitted)); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State (Abbeville
II), 767 S.E.2d 157, 161 (S.C. 2014) (“‘[A]ll statutes are presumed constitutional and, if
possible, will be construed to render them valid.’ Accordingly, we will not find a statute uncon-
stitutional unless ‘its repugnance to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Curtis v. State, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (S.C. 2001))).
224. See Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 432 (“The factors we have recounted that bear on the
adequacy of the statute’s funding provisions thoroughly refute the State’s fundamental
contention that ... the [prescibed] amount is adequate to provide the basic thorough and
efficient education and that all spending in excess of the [prescibed] amount in the wealthy
and successful districts is educational waste; those considerations undermine any presump-
tion in favor of the validity of the statute’s funding measures.”); DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 776
(“There is no question that Ohio’s system of school funding violates the [education clause] of
the Ohio Constitution.”); Abbeville II, 767 S.E.2d at 175 (“The measurable inputs and outputs
show that the Defendants have failed to provide students in the Plaintiff Districts the
requisite constitutional opportunity.”).
225. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 n.2 (11th ed. 1985).
226. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
297, 304 (1997).
227. Id. at 307 (crediting Gerald Gunther as one of the influential and earliest proponents
of that view (citing Gunther, supra note 178, at 20-24)).
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indeed, the categorization of the means has often been “outcome-
determinative.”228 Legislative means that are based on suspect
classifications or that burden fundamental rights rarely withstand
strict scrutiny (because they are usually not necessary, narrowly
tailored, or least restrictive).229 Consequently, under federal doc-
trine, “the fit between means and ends has tended to be a mere
formality, and ends scrutiny has been notably absent.”230
There has been some recent deviation from this pattern; “‘rational
basis with bite’ may provide the clearest example of the Court’s
renewed interest in government purposes” or ends scrutiny.231 In
these cases, although the Court applied rational basis review, it
struck down the challenged law, perceiving “that the actual
ends—as distinct from the proffered ends—motivating the legisla-
tion were illegitimate.”232 Some have suggested, for example, that
the Court applied rational basis with bite in Lawrence233 and
Windsor.234 In general, however, “ends scrutiny is [still] considered
particularly intrusive to other branches of government because it
involves ... expressing that the Court does not believe the govern-
ment’s statement of its purpose.”235
State court adjudication of education clause claims diverges from
federal means-end testing in two ways. First, ends scrutiny has not
been used to “smoke out” illicit motives or improper purposes.236
228. Id. at 304.
229. See id. at 303.
230. Id. at 304; see also John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387,
2448 (2003) (“In cases involving presumptively valid legislation, the Court, with rare excep-
tion, has refused to consider the legitimacy of legislative ends. The Court has also backed
away from its Lochner-era insistence on a substantial means-ends fit.” (footnotes omitted)).
231. Bhagwat, supra note 226, at 312 (quoting Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis
with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 799, 800-03 (1987)).
232. Id. (emphasis omitted).
233. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 178, at 808-09; Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike
Down Marriage Restrictions Under Rational-Basis Review, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
331, 336 (2013).
234. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of
Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 872 & n.252 (2014) (citing cases discussing the Windsor
standard of review); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage
Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 206-11 (2013). But see Russell K. Robinson, Une-
qual Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 165-66 (2016) (“[S]exual orientation enjoys a tier of its
own, and ... [t]he animus model that the Court applies to sexual orientation claims ... defies
traditional categories and seems to evade particular constraints of the two-track approach.”).
235. Spece & Yokum, supra note 203, at 297.
236. See Niels Petersen, Legislative Inconsistency and the “Smoking Out” of Illicit Motives,
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That brand of ends scrutiny is often unnecessary in cases where the
education clause already prescribes the purpose for the legislation,
namely, to provide a constitutionally adequate education.237
Although courts have found excuses for legislative inaction unsatis-
factory or intolerable, they generally have assumed that legislators
acted in “good faith” even after successive rounds of litigation.238
Indeed, when the Washington Supreme Court held the legislature
in contempt for failure to comply with its previous rulings, the court
said it “assumes and expects that the other branches of government
will comply in good faith.”239 A year later, with the legislature still
in contempt, the court again acknowledged the “good intentions” of
the legislature’s “pledge” before insisting it was “not a plan for
achieving full constitutional compliance.”240
Second, it is means scrutiny, not ends scrutiny, that has been
notably absent in school finance cases. Courts understand that the
school “budget is a prerogative of the Legislature and Executive,”241
64 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 122 (2016) (“[M]eans-ends tests have an instrumental purpose: they
are used to ‘smoke out’ illicit motives.”). But see Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact:
Some Behavioral Realism About Equal Protection, 66 ALA. L. REV. 627, 644 (2015) (“[T]he
function of strict means-ends scrutiny is less to be an information sensor and more to function
as a substantive shield against certain types of actions.”).
237. See Cochran, supra note 190, at 438 (“[S]chool officials likely would have little problem
proving that their ‘ends’ are ‘legitimate’ or ‘compelling’ because the school financing pre-
cedents already have established that districts have an affirmative constitutional duty to
provide educational services.”).
238. See, e.g., Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State, 958 A.2d 930, 932 (N.H. 2008)
(“We presume that ... the legislature acted in good faith and crafted a responsive mandate
intended to address the constitutional infirmities of the prior legislation.”); Abbott VII, 971
A.2d 989, 1008 (N.J. 2009) (“The State has constructed a fair and equitable means designed
to fund the costs of a thorough and efficient education .... The quality of the effort and the good
faith exhibited in the exercise of discretion over and over again ... lead us to conclude that the
legislative effort deserves deference.”); Robinson v. Cahill, (Robinson V), 355 A.2d 129, 187
(N.J. 1976) (per curiam) (“The decisions which we have rendered have not been written with
an eye to impugning either the integrity or good faith of the Governor or the Legislature.”);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 89 (Wash. 1978) (“[W]e are firmly convinced the
other branches of government also will carry out their defined constitutional duties in good
faith and in a completely responsible manner.”); Campbell IV, 181 P.3d 43, 68 (Wyo. 2008)
(“We hold that the state acted in good faith on issues of operations funding and heeded the
urgency expressed in our opinions.”).
239. Contempt Order at 10, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2015) (No. 84362-7).
240. Continuing Contempt Order at 11, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2016) (No.
84362-7).
241. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE III ), 861 N.E.2d 50, 58 (N.Y. 2006).
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and that the “details of education policymaking” are innumerable,242
testing a “delicate balancing of powers and responsibilities among
coordinate branches of government.”243 Therefore, most courts have
conferred substantial deference to the other branches in determin-
ing the means to fulfill a state’s affirmative duty to provide a consti-
tutionally adequate education:
 “The General Assembly must provide adequate funding for the
system. How they do this is their decision.”244
 “The legislature generally enjoys broad discretion in selecting
the means of discharging its duty under [the education clause],
including deciding which programs are necessary to deliver the
constitutionally required ‘education.’”245
 “We shall presume at this time that the Commonwealth will
fulfil its responsibility with respect to defining the specifics and
the appropriate means to provide the constitutionally-required
education.”246
 “This Court cannot suggest methods of fixing the problem, but
we can recognize a constitutional violation when we see one.”247
 “[The] Kansas Constitution clearly leaves to the legislature
the myriad of choices available to perform its constitutional
duty.”248
Rather than engage in any meaningful means scrutiny, courts
since at least Robinson I have been primarily concerned with “the
end product.”249 While acknowledging the “many different ways”
242. See Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1152 (Mass. 2005).
243. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 258.
244. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 216 (Ky. 1989).
245. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 251-52.
246. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 n.92 (Mass. 1993).
247. Abbeville II, 767 S.E.2d 157, 175 (S.C. 2014).
248. Gannon I, 319 P.3d 1196, 1226 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam).
249. Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973); accord Columbia Falls Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 262 (Mont. 2005) (“Nonetheless, in order to address the
Coalition’s claims we have to address the educational product that the present school system
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that adequacy standards can be satisfied, courts nevertheless insist
that the standards “must be satisfied.”250 Progress toward such ends
is “typically measured through proficiency levels on end-of-grade
standardized tests, graduation rates, and preparedness for higher
education, employment, and the responsibilities of citizenship.”251
Such ends scrutiny can eclipse inquiries into the degree of fit
between the legislative means and the constitutional ends. A few
state courts have nevertheless specified the degree of fit they expect,
echoing the U.S. Supreme Court: “[A] fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest
served.’”252 The reasonableness of the fit dates back to that first-
wave New Jersey trial court decision: “The Legislature may
approach the goal required by the Education Clause by any methods
reasonably calculated to accomplish that purpose consistent with
the equal protection requirements of law.”253 And that is still the
benchmark used by third-wave courts in Kansas,254 Washington,255
Wyoming,256 and New York,257 among others.
The Texas Supreme Court explains why “the crux” of this inquiry
“is reasonableness”:
provides, not just the manner in which the Legislature funds that school system.”).
250. E.g., Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 784 (Tex.
2005).
251. Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2016).
252. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (quoting In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
253. Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (emphasis add-
ed), modified, Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
254. See Gannon I, 319 P.3d 1196, 1236-37 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam) (“[The] adequacy
[requirement] is met when the public education financing system provided by the legislature
for grades K-12—through structure and implementation—is reasonably calculated to have all
Kansas public education students meet or exceed the standards set out in Rose and presently
codified in [the relevant statute].” (emphasis added)).
255. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 248 (Wash. 2012) (“[W]e must ask whether the state
action achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally prescribed end.’” (em-
phasis added) (quoting Hershkoff, supra note 177, at 1137)).
256. See Campbell IV, 181 P.3d 43, 55 (Wyo. 2008) (“[T]he parties somewhat lost
perspective on the primary constitutional issue—does the state’s chosen method of funding
represent, as close as reasonably possible, the cost of education.” (emphasis added)).
257. CFE III, 861 N.E.2d 50, 57 (N.Y. 2006) (“The role of the courts is not ... to determine
the best way to calculate the cost of a sound basic education ... but to determine whether the
State’s proposed calculation of that cost is rational.... [Here] the state budget plan had already
reasonably calculated that cost.” (emphasis added)).
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These [adequacy] standards import a wide spectrum of consider-
ations and are admittedly imprecise, but they are not without
content. At one extreme, no one would dispute that a public
education system limited to teaching first-grade reading would
be inadequate, or that a system without resources to accomplish
its purposes would be inefficient and unsuitable. At the other,
few would insist that merely to be adequate, public education
must teach all students multiple languages or nuclear biophys-
ics, or that to be efficient, available resources must be unlimited.
In between, there is much else on which reasonable minds
should come together, and much over which they may differ.258
Again, however, the reasonableness of the fit need not be exam-
ined, as suggested by the Washington Supreme Court’s use of the
disjunctive in its test: “[W]e must ask whether the state action
achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve ‘the constitutionally
prescribed end.’”259 Indeed, on one side of the disjunctive, most
courts that have initially struck down a school financing scheme
have been persuaded that the facts conclusively established that
the ends have not been or cannot be achieved, without assessing
the reasonableness of the fit.260 On the other side, when courts have
upheld the financing scheme, often after successive rounds of
litigation, they have taken assurances from the fact that, even
though the ends have not yet been fully achieved, the means are
258. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 (Tex. 2005).
259. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248 (emphasis added) (citing Hershkoff, supra note 177, at
1137).
260. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989)
(“[W]hen we consider the evidence in the record, and when we apply the constitutional
requirement ..., it is crystal clear that the General Assembly has fallen short of its duty to
enact legislation to provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the state.”);
McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he record
shows clearly that, while the present statutory and financial schemes purport to provide equal
educational opportunity in the public schools for every child, rich or poor, the reality is that
children in the less affluent communities (or in the less affluent parts of them) are not re-
ceiving their constitutional entitlement of education as intended and mandated by the framers
of the Constitution.”).
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reasonably calculated to achieve them.261 And that may “be the best
that we can do.”262
III. A JUDICIAL CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE: TO WHAT END?
It is ironic that state courts have been disposed to scrutinizing the
achievement of constitutional ends given their uncertainty at times
about what those ends should be. Recall that first-wave courts ac-
cepted equality à la horizontal equity as the appropriate, if impracti-
cal, end; second-wave courts gradually espoused vertical equity, the
more pragmatic form of equality; and third-wave courts surged
predominantly toward the end goal of adequacy as a font of positive
liberty.263 For the past two decades, advocates and scholars have
predicted or proposed a “fourth wave” with new ends in sight.264
Whether or not that fourth wave ever surfaces, there has been a
strong undercurrent drifting a few courts toward both adequacy and
261. See, e.g., Abbott VII, 971 A.2d 989, 1009 (N.J. 2009) (“The legislative and executive
branches of government have enacted a funding formula that is designed to achieve a thor-
ough and efficient education for every child, regardless of where he or she lives.... There is no
absolute guarantee that [statute] will achieve the results desired by all. The political branches
of government, however, are entitled to take reasoned steps, even if the outcome cannot be
assured, to address the pressing social, economic, and educational challenges confronting our
state. They should not be locked in a constitutional straitjacket.”); Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 789-
90 (“Having carefully reviewed the evidence and the [factual] findings, we cannot conclude
that the Legislature has acted arbitrarily in structuring and funding the public education
system so that school districts are not reasonably able to afford all students the access to
education and the educational opportunity to accomplish a general diffusion of knowledge.”).
262. Campbell I, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (emphasis omitted); accord Campbell IV,
181 P.3d 43, 67 (Wyo. 2008) (“In every school finance case, this Court has consistently
recognized the constitutional directive that it is the legislature’s duty and prerogative to
determine the appropriate standards for our public schools and to assure sufficient funding
is provided to allow the districts to achieve those standards. While perfection is not required
or expected, a good faith effort to preserve and protect our constitution’s commitment to a
sound public education system is. We are convinced, as was the district court, that the state
has met that standard and will continue to do so in the future.”).
263. See supra Part II.A.
264. See generally David G. Hinojosa, “Race-Conscious” School Finance Litigation: Is a
Fourth Wave Emerging?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 869 (2016); Ryan, supra note 48, at 307-10;
Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. REV.
857 (2006); Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in
School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613 (2007); Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The
Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation: Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate
Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (2010); McMillan, supra note 48.
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vertical equity (that is, equal liberty).265 Two structural barriers
have prevented this undercurrent from emerging as a wave of its
own, however.
First, courts have tended to analyze vertical equity and adequacy
separately, treating them as distinct claims or remedies. For a time,
that orientation was understandable, given that vertical equity and
adequacy originated from different constitutional sources: equal
protection and education clauses, respectively.266 But the distinction
has carried over even when vertical equity and adequacy are said to
share the same source.267 The Kansas Supreme Court, for instance,
recognized that “equity and adequacy” are “two components” of its
education clause.268 Yet that court has identified them as separate
“challenges”269 subject to separate constitutional “tests.”270 Most re-
265. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View III), 91 S.W.3d 472, 500
(Ark. 2002) (recognizing the state must “determine whether equal educational opportunity for
an adequate education is being substantially afforded”); Gannon I, 319 P.3d 1196, 1219 (Kan.
2014) (per curiam) (“We have recognized that [the education clause] contains at least two
components: equity and adequacy.”); Helena I, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989) (“[T]he State
has failed to provide a system of quality public education granting to each student the equal-
ity of educational opportunity guaranteed.”); Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 375 (N.J. 1990) (“[W]e
conclude that a significant number of poorer urban districts do not provide a thorough and
efficient education for their students; that the measurement of the constitutional requirement
must account for the needs of the students; that in most poorer urban districts, the education
needed to equip the students for their roles as citizens and workers exceeds that needed by
students in more affluent districts; that the education provided depends to a significant extent
on the money spent for it, and on what that money can buy—in quality and quantity—and the
ability to innovate.”); Hoke I, 599 S.E.2d 365, 393 (N.C. 2004) (agreeing with the trial court
that the state failed to meet the needs of at-risk students and thus deprived them of an
adequate education); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993, 999-1000 (Ohio 2000)
(recognizing the “inherent inequities” and “inadequacies” of “funding systems that rely too
much on local property taxes”); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter (McWherter II), 894
S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tenn. 1995) (“It appears that the [statute] addresses both constitutional
mandates imposed upon the State—the obligation to maintain and support a system of free
public schools and the obligation that that system afford substantially equal educational
opportunities.”); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 252 (Wash. 2012) (noting the tax source
“implicates both the equity and the adequacy of the K-12 funding system”).
266. See, e.g., Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 486 (considering in turn contentions “on
adequacy under Article 14” and “equality under Article 2, §§ 2, 3, and 18”).
267. See, e.g., McCleary, 269 P.3d at 252 (considering a claim under the education clause
noting the tax source “implicates both the equity and the adequacy of the K-12 funding sys-
tem”).
268. Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1219.
269. See id.
270. The adequacy test is measured against the Rose standards and state law. Id. at 1236-
37. The equity test does not require adherence to “precise equality standards,” but “[s]chool
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cently, the Kansas Supreme Court held separate oral arguments
and issued separate opinions for each component.271 Even when
courts have acknowledged the “considerable overlap between the is-
sue of whether a school funding system is inadequate and whether
it is inequitable,” they have nonetheless analyzed vertical equity
and adequacy separately.272 Hence, courts have not established
standards for mutually enforcing these reciprocal demands.273 And,
until recently, the symbiosis of adequacy and vertical equity has
been undertheorized.274
Second, justiciability concerns still haunt courts despite decades
of resolute enforcement of the right to education.275 Indeed, seven
third-wave courts were so concerned about separation of powers
that they refused to entertain the merits of school finance challen-
ges, rendering the right to education in those states nonjusticiable
and abdicating the judiciary’s role entirely.276 Courts’ abiding fear
“that they might overstep the boundaries of their authority”277
makes them averse to line drawing and reticent about standards
generally. Due to the complexity of adequacy standards, education
policy making, and budget appropriations, courts also doubt their
institutional competency to order a remedy.278 Consequently, even
though a majority of courts have entertained the merits of adequacy
claims and found a constitutional violation, justiciability concerns
districts must have reasonably equal access to substantially similar educational opportunity
through similar tax effort.” Id. at 1239.
271. See Gannon v. State (Gannon IV), 390 P.3d 461, 468 (Kan. 2017) (per curiam); see also
Gannon v. State (Gannon III), 372 P.3d 1181 (Kan. 2016) (per curiam); Gannon v. State
(Gannon II), 368 P.3d 1024 (Kan. 2016) (per curiam).
272. See Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 496 (Ark. 2002) (“Deficiencies in certain public
schools in certain school districts can sustain a finding of inadequacy but also, when compared
to other schools in other districts, a finding of inequality. Bearing that in mind, we first ad-
dress whether state revenues paid to the school districts under the school-funding formula is
the test for deciding equality or whether the test is actual expenditures spent on the
students.”).
273. See Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 974 (explaining that “the difficulty lies
in vague education clauses”).
274. See Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at 480-83.
275. See generally Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of
Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 83 (2010).
276. See supra note 189.
277. Black, supra note 119, at 463.
278. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 275, at 99.
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dissuade them from undertaking any means scrutiny, leaving it to
the legislature to decide exactly how to remedy the violation.279
During and after the Great Recession, even courts that had been
reliably active and emphatic in their demands on state government
“stopped short of dictating remedies at a level of detail that en-
croaches on legislative prerogative.”280
Sustained legislative resistance and defiance to school finance
decisions, especially within the past decade, proved courts are right
to be concerned about exercising judicial authority. For example,
“the New Jersey Supreme Court has been the most aggressive of
any in enforcing education rights and duties.”281 School finance liti-
gation has been ongoing there in one form or another since that
first-wave trial court decision in the early 1970s.282 Yet there are
signs now that the repeated showdowns with the state legislature
are starting to take their toll.283 In 2009, for the first time in
decades, the court relented, agreeing that the funding formula was
at least reasonably calculated to provide a constitutionally adequate
education.284 Within a year of that decision, however, “the state
made massive cuts to the funding formula.”285 When the case even-
tually worked its way back to the court, it only “restored funding to
a subset of school districts, but not all,” effectively excusing “$600
million in cuts to disadvantaged districts.”286
Even among courts that have maintained their assertiveness, for
example, the Washington and Kansas Supreme Courts, “the legis-
latures in those states defied or evaded the courts’ orders.”287 Recall
279. See Bauries, supra note 27, at 742 (“These courts, like the courts completely abstain-
ing, have often referred to separation of powers principles to justify remedial abstention.”).
280. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
75, 114 (2016) (“When lower courts have peremptorily mandated specific remedies, some
higher courts have been quick to strike them down, particularly when there was more than
one way to solve the problem.”).
281. Black, supra note 119, at 453.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 453-54; Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, Tough Times and Weak
Review: The 2008 Economic Meltdown and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights in US State
Courts, in ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 234 (Aoife
Nolan ed., 2014).
284. See Abbott VII, 971 A.2d 989, 1009 (N.J. 2009).
285. Black, supra note 119, at 454.
286. Id. at 455.
287. Id. at 456.
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that the Washington Supreme Court was forced to impose contempt
sanctions on the state legislature for failing to comply with its
orders to draft a remedial plan.288 In Kansas, defiant legislators and
the Governor turned on the court, threatening to make “changes to
judicial funding and appointment.”289 The Kansas Supreme Court
weathered that political storm; the four justices who were targeted
by opposition groups were nevertheless retained in the 2016 elec-
tion.290 All the while, the court has continued to issue equity and
adequacy decisions.291 Nevertheless, the lengths to which state law-
makers were willing to go to obstruct such decisions might give
pause to the highest courts in other states, if not the Kansas Su-
preme Court.
Given the lack of standards for mutually enforcing adequacy and
vertical equity, the persistent justiciability concerns, and the es-
calating legislative resistance, it is little wonder that the equal
liberty undercurrent has not developed into its own wave. Although
acute in equal liberty claims, these problems are endemic to school
finance litigation, which one scholar compared to a Russian novel:
“[I]t’s long, tedious, and everybody dies in the end.”292 But in fact,
school finance litigation has not ended and shows no signs that it
will. On the contrary, there may well be a resurgence in state court
challenges following the passage of the ESSA, which enacts “an
enormous devolution of power to states.”293 Therefore, any hope that
the equal liberty claim will mature and improve the cause of school
finance litigation in this new political and legal environment rests
on developing solutions to problems of judicial review which have
eroded the confidence of courts.
It is encouraging that previous reforms proposed by scholars have
directly or indirectly influenced the adjudication of school finance
cases. Scott Bauries surveyed some of these “adjudicatory reforms”
288. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
289. Black, supra note 119, at 456-57.
290. See Associated Press, Justices Retained to the Kansas Supreme Court, KSN.COM (Nov.
9, 2016, 7:47 AM), http://ksn.com/2016/11/09/justices-retained-to-the-kansas-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/DW3K-96XA].
291. See Gannon IV, 390 P.3d 461 (Kan. 2017) (per curiam); Gannon III, 372 P.3d 1181
(Kan. 2016) (per curiam); Gannon II, 368 P.3d 1024 (Kan. 2016) (per curiam).
292. Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991).
293. Black, supra note 35, at 131.
2017] EQUAL LIBERTY IN PROPORTION 271
described below.294 Alas, none of the reforms that have been adopted
have fully resolved the problems plaguing judicial review of the
state constitutional right to education.
A. “Output-Based” Review
At the beginning of the third wave, Molly McUsic proposed that
courts conduct an “‘output-based,’ rather than ‘input-based’” review
of adequacy claims.295 Specifically, she proposed that courts adopt
state-developed educational standards as the measure of adequacy
and ensure that the state is enabling children to satisfy those
standards.296 McUsic argued that by enforcing only education stan-
dards (outputs) rather than financing (inputs), the courts avoided
actual policy making and any attendant separation of powers
concerns.297 In line with the main thrust of McUsic’s proposal, most
third-wave courts have judged constitutionality on the outputs (the
ends) more so than the inputs (the means).298
Bauries rightly points out that no state can maintain a constitu-
tional school financing scheme if it is to be judged strictly and solely,
through testing or other measures, by whether all children are in
fact reaching the adequacy threshold.299 But that critique takes
McUsic’s proposal far too literally. No court has endorsed equality
of outcomes as the end-goal; none appear to be operating under the
“delusion that all children can or want to achieve the same out-
comes.”300 Rather, the output that courts assess is whether “every
294. See Bauries, supra note 27, at 721-35.
295. See id. at 722 (citing Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance
Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 329-30 (1991)).
296. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation,
28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 330 (1991).
297. See id.
298. See supra Part II.A. But courts generally have not used state-developed standards to
set the constitutional bar, as McUsic proposed. See Bauries, supra note 27, at 723. Instead,
as previously discussed, courts have devised their own standards for adequacy. See supra
notes 122-27 and accompanying text. This has been a positive development because court-
adopted standards prevent states from setting the bar low “through a simple legislative or
administrative change in the learning standards.” Bauries, supra note 27, at 724.
299. See id. at 723-24 (suggesting McUsic’s proposal “would virtually guarantee that a
state’s system would be unconstitutional in perpetuity” which would itself “offend the separa-
tion of powers”).
300. See Weishart, Transcending, supra note 34, at 485.
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child” has “the same opportunity and access to an adequate educa-
tion.”301 And, as previously explained, when the evidence is not con-
clusive on that score, courts look to the degree of fit between the
inputs and the outputs,302 just as the next scholar proposed.
B. “A Jurisprudence of Consequences”
As the third wave was in full motion, Helen Hershkoff proposed
a “Jurisprudence of Consequences,” wherein a court’s review should
concentrate on whether the legislation “is likely to effectuate the
constitutional goal.”303 Bauries observes that Hershkoff ’s proposal
and other similar scholarship recognize state constitutional rights
to education as “positive rights” that “compel affirmative action.”304
Hence, Hershkoff explains that the question is not “How does this
policy burden a constitutional right?”305 That question would be apt
if the right to education were merely a negative right. The question
for positive rights enforcement is rather “How does this policy fur-
ther a constitutional right?”306 More precisely, the question is
whether the statute “achieves, or is at least likely to achieve, the
constitutionally prescribed end.”307
The Washington Supreme Court quoted this language almost
verbatim as its constitutional test.308 “The test,” as Hershkoff noted,
“should be ‘one of fitness to an end.’”309 And, as previously discussed,
a few courts have expressed that they expect a reasonable degree of
fit between the means and ends.310 By engaging in this type of
review, Hershkoff contemplated that the state court’s decision would
“comprise only the opening statement in a public dialogue with the
other branches of government and the people.”311 Together, the court
along with the other branches would “develop and share information
301. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989).
302. See supra Part II.A.
303. Hershkoff, supra note 177, at 1183-84.
304. Bauries, supra note 27, at 731-32.
305. Hershkoff, supra note 177, at 1184.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1137.
308. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
309. Hershkoff, supra note 177, at 1137 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103 (1921)).
310. See supra notes 252-58, 261.
311. Hershkoff, supra note 177, at 1163.
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about workable alternatives that might reasonably carry out the
state constitutional ... mandate.”312 As Bauries notes, this “ongoing
‘dialog’ with the coordinate branches” represents “a version of the
dialogic approach” discussed next.313
C. “The Dialogic Approach”
Scholars advocating the dialogic approach believe that “courts
should adjudicate the merits, but should abstain from making spe-
cific injunctive remedial orders binding on state legislatures.”314
Bauries identifies three strains of the dialogic approach—“active,”
“super active,” and “passive”—based on varying degrees to which
courts should abstain from remediation.315 Nevertheless, the three
strains converge toward “a rough consensus that, once the merits
are adjudicated, courts should abstain from ordering or compelling
any specific, judge-made remedial measures, but should instead en-
gage in dialog with the coordinate branches to encourage reform.”316
312. Id. at 1184.
313. Bauries, supra note 27, at 733.
314. Id. at 725 (citing Michael Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive
Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73, 76-84 (2000)).
315. The active dialogic approach favored by William Thro requires courts to “defer to the
more politically accountable branches for remediation, but—rather than completely ab-
staining from all aspects of remediation—they should give guidance to the coordinate
branches as to how to remedy the violation.” Id. at 726 (citing William E. Thro, A New Ap-
proach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & Pol. 525, 552
(1998)). The super active approach favored by Michael Rebell would take that guidance a step
further, seeing “the courts’ role as one of specifying legislative actions that must be taken to
determine necessary expenditure levels, ... setting up mechanisms for ensuring account-
ability,” and then managing the remediation. See id. at 728 (citing Rebell, Poverty, supra note
119, at 1540-42). At the other extreme, a court employing the passive approach favored by
Larry Obhof will entirely refrain from specifying a course of action from the legislature,
limiting itself to applying the constitutional standard to the factual record. See Larry J.
Obhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance Litigation, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 602-03 (2004).
316. See Bauries, supra note 27, at 733. A variant of the dialogic approach, “non-court-
centric judicial review” proposed by James Liebman and Charles Sabel, views “the courts’ role
as providing a forum for debate over educational issues between the public and its represen-
tatives,” particularly about “outcome standards.” See id. at 729-30 (citing James S. Liebman
& Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of
School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 280-82 (2003)).
“In contrast to at least the passive form of the dialogic model, though, Liebman and Sabel’s
model would allow these politically developed standards to become the means by which courts
can monitor compliance with the constitution and with judicial orders on an ongoing basis.”
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By Bauries’s count, eleven state supreme courts have taken the
dialogic approach, abstaining in one way or another from remedia-
tion.317 That observation accords with the one made here that most
courts defer to legislatures concerning the means to achieve the
constitutional end.318 Only a few courts have on occasion diverged,
stipulating certain remedial steps to the legislature, as the next
scholar proposed.
D. “Policy-Directive Remedial Orders”
Contrary to the previous proposals, James Ryan believes that
courts can and should have a significant role in formulating reme-
dies, including issuing specific education policy directives.319 “If
courts are willing, as they should be, to determine whether state
constitutions create a right to equal or adequate educational oppor-
tunities,” Ryan contends, “they must be committed to defining the
content of those opportunities.”320 So, for example, Ryan has argued
that content should include preschool, and that courts should
require states “to increase access to preschool” as a remedy for
violations of state constitutional rights to education.321
By Bauries’s count, at least seven courts have authorized “policy-
directive remedial orders, ranging from requiring the legislative
body in the state to commission a third-party study to determine the
cost of providing an adequate education system, to mandating the
Id. at 730.
317. Id. at 742 & n.224 (citing decisions in Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mon-
tana, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Washington).
318. See supra Part II.A.
319. See James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 85-86
(2006); see also Ryan, supra note 122, at 1226, 1256 (disagreeing with the “shibboleth ... that
courts should focus on outcomes rather than inputs”).
320. Ryan, supra note 319, at 85.
321. See id. at 85-86. “If courts conclude they are authorized and competent to assess the
inputs and outputs necessary to give life to the right to an adequate education, they are nec-
essarily authorized and competent to decide the preschool question.” Id. at 86. Nevertheless,
only the New Jersey Supreme Court has decided that question in favor of recognizing certain
disadvantaged students have “a right to preschool.” See id. at 52 (citing Abbott v. Burke, 748
A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000)). Three other state supreme courts in Massachusetts, North Carolina, and
Arkansas, however, “declined to recognize a right to preschool, all overturning trial court
decisions that had done so.” Id. at 52 & n.18 (citing Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d 472, 500-02 (Ark.
2002); Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1156-57 (Mass. 2005); Hoke I, 599
S.E.2d 365, 393-94 (N.C. 2004)).
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actual appropriation of additional state funding for education.”322
Notably, some of these decisions came after dialogic approaches
failed.323 Hence, the overriding preference of courts is still to defer
to legislative means to remedy violations. As discussed next,
Bauries himself thinks such deference is due because of the nature
of the education duty imposed on the legislature.
E. “The Education Duty”
Bauries proposes that state courts reverse their approach to
judicial review, from “a substance-oriented approach of review to a
more process-oriented form of review.”324 He claims such a reversal
is in order because the focus on “the substantive results of legisla-
tive enactments,” that is, ends scrutiny, “has led some courts to
overreach their institutional boundaries and other courts to
abdicate their judicial role.”325 Moreover, Bauries contends that the
“right” to education is better construed as a fiduciary “duty” of
loyalty and due care owed by state legislatures, obligating them “to
pursue the ends identified” without entitling children “to a partic-
ular level of government service.”326
Bauries therefore envisions a form of means scrutiny that is
highly deferential—so long as the legislature gathers the necessary
information and gives it appropriate consideration when it enacts
a “school finance system, the system should not be struck down as
‘inadequate’” even if it is imperfect.327 He concedes that “such a
322. Bauries, supra note 27, at 742-43, 742 n.225 (citing decisions in Arkansas, Kansas,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Wyoming).
323. See id. at 742 n.225.
324. Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 717 (2012).
325. Id. at 718.
326. See id. at 736, 748-53. “Scholars are divided over how best to interpret this precedent,”
whether it creates individual rights or legislative duties. See Black, supra note 280, at 116 &
n.214 (discussing competing views on individual education rights-holders). Bauries maintains
education clause precedent does not create “any individual student rights-holders.” Scott R.
Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 48 GA. L. REV. 949,
952-53 (2014). Derek Black and Joshua Weishart think otherwise. See Weishart, Reconstitu-
ting, supra note 34, at 948-49 (contending that the vast majority of courts have recognized the
right to education as a Hohfeldian claim-right imposing a duty on state); Derek Black, The
Constitutional Fix for SC Schools, STATE (Nov. 18, 2012) [https://perma.cc/ASQ6-PNTT]
(reasoning that students had individually enforceable constitutional rights to education that
the court should recognize).
327. See Bauries, supra note 324, at 762. Rather, Bauries suggests that courts should
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deferential approach will make plaintiff victories significantly
rarer.”328 Bauries maintains, however, that a “challenge to an entire
legislative scheme based on the substantive terms of a state’s
education clause should meet a high burden.”329 In other words,
“plaintiff victories should indeed be rare.”330
It is questionable whether the right to education is being “overen-
forced,” as Bauries contends.331 After all, by his own count, only
seven courts have issued or contemplated issuing policy-directive
remedial orders.332 And, in most of those cases, they did so only
when forced by their recalcitrant legislatures after repeatedly trying
the dialogic approach.333 Thus, Bauries’s proposal seems to be an
overcorrection of a relatively insignificant and infrequent “problem.”
Still, Bauries’s proposal is also meant to address the
underenforcement of the right to education, which threatens to
devalue that right.334 A deferential means review that focuses on
process over substance and places a high burden on plaintiffs
presents little risk to courts. If judicial review entails no more than
this, courts would likely be encouraged to at least entertain school
finance challenges and not abdicate their role entirely, as seven
courts have done. Although well-tailored to correct for such nonen-
forcement of the right to education, Bauries’s proposal represents a
rather dramatic reversal to the majority of courts who already deem
that right justiciable and regularly entertain the merits of school
finance challenges. As discussed, most of these courts have now-
longstanding precedents deferring to legislature means.335 Moreover,
strike down state education finance plans only when “the legislature has essentially abdicated
its role by failing to act at all in the face of obvious needs, or by acting without due care by
failing to consider relevant, material, and available information about the state’s existing
education system’s needs and flaws.” Id. at 762-63.
328. Id. at 763.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 760.
332. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. Breaking the numbers down further: only
two of the seven courts ordered specific legislation or budget appropriations. See Bauries,
supra note 27, at 742 n.225 (citing cases). Two more merely contemplated issuing such orders,
or empowered the trial court to do so if necessary. See id. (citing cases). Two courts ordered
costing-out studies, while another reserved the right to continue monitoring the capital funds
budget. See id. (citing cases). These are hardly exemplars of judicial overreach.
334. See Bauries, supra note 324, at 733.
335. See supra Part II.B.
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disengaging courts from scrutinizing the achievement of constitu-
tional ends also threatens to devalue the right to education, in that
a review of legislative process alone disregards the right’s sub-
stance.
According to our next scholar, another way to deal with the
underenforcement problem is for courts to engage in a prospective
form of review and adopt remedies, rules, and structures that will
prevent rights violations from occurring in the first place.
F. “Proactive Intervention”
Against the backdrop of plaintiffs’ recent losses in school finance
cases, budget cuts, and teacher shortages in the wake of the Great
Recession, Derek Black proposes a judicial review that evaluates the
right to education “prospectively and retrospectively,” to “not only
cure existing deficiencies, but also plan for future exigencies” in
order to avert the next educational crisis.336 He thus proposes a type
of proactive intervention that can be achieved through “deterrence-
based remedies, prophylactic rules, and prophylactic decisionmak-
ing structures.”337
To deter violations in the short term, state courts need to give
“clear notice of how to comply with their constitutions,” engage in
“consistent and firm enforcement,” and impose “real cost” for
noncompliance, including fines for contempt.338 Some of the
prophylactic rules that courts could adopt include creating relative
baselines for class sizes and funding increases339 such as “mandating
that disadvantaged districts be funded at a level no lower than the
average per-pupil expenditure in high-performing suburban
336. Black, supra note 119, at 468. Black explains that part of the problem with current
thinking about the justiciability of the right to education is that “[i]t rests on the notion that
the delivery of education, and the judicial oversight and enforcement of rights, occurs at
singular moments in time rather than over the course of years.” Id. That thinking is mistaken
because “education is an ongoing project” and “educational harms and failures are not easily
remedied after the fact.” Id. at 469. Consequently, courts must “shape remedies to bring states
into current compliance [and] require the state to take steps to ward off the possibility of new
state violations.” Id. at 470.
337. Id. at 468.
338. See id. at 470-71.
339. See id. at 474 (first citing FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; and then citing COLO. CONST. art.
IX, § 17).
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districts.”340 Similar to Bauries’s proposed review of legislative pro-
cess, courts could also impose prophylactic decision-making struc-
tures on legislatures to “incorporate expert knowledge into funding
decisions,” and then give those “expert assessments presumptive
weight in later disputes.”341
To deter violations in the long term, Black explains that courts
need standards that will “allow the executive or legislative branch
to judge the constitutionality of their own actions [and] reinforce the
notion that the states’ constitutional education duty is governed by
legal principles not simply judicial wisdom or judgement.”342 The
standard that is arguably most needed in that regard does not
appear in the previous scholars’ proposals. Such a standard of re-
view must overcome justiciability concerns while enabling courts to
mutually enforce vertical equity and adequacy, and thereby
reconcile equality and liberty interests.
IV. DIRECT-PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
A half century of school finance litigation has brought us an equal
liberty claim under the state constitutional right to education that
has never been enforced as such.343 All the while, “states generally
have not taken consistent and sustained action to adopt and
maintain funding systems that promote equal access to an excellent
education.”344 The “primary shortcomings” continue to be “lower
funding to districts serving students with greater needs” (vertical
inequity) and “low funding levels” coupled with an “insufficient
linkage of funding systems to desired educational outcomes”
340. See id. (citing Abbott IV, 693 A.2d 417, 439 (N.J. 1997)).
341. See id. at 476-77. Black acknowledges that dictating “structural changes to the legis-
lative process [is] beyond the power of the judiciary and would be inappropriate in any event.”
Id. at 478. He proposes that courts could instead “impose constitutional discipline” by being
“clear about the elements and issues that should be involved in positive lawmaking, the re-
strictions and justifications it would place on retrogressive law making, and the weight it
would afford to certain types of evidence.” Id. at 479; see also Derek W. Black, Taking Teacher
Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1659 (2016) (contending that courts should
“demand that states account for and address all of the internal and external forces ... that
matter”).
342. Black supra note 119, at 473.
343. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
344. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, No Quick Fix for Equity and Excellence: The Virtues of
Incremental Shifts in Education Federalism, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 201, 202 (2016).
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(inadequacy).345 Although there is no quick fix, one of the persistent
problems has been the tendency of courts to “run from complexity
rather than confront it.”346 Hence, the number of second- and third-
wave courts that have declined to specify a standard of review
despite, in fact, using one.347 The Vermont Supreme Court once
rationalized not specifying a standard, claiming, “This is not a case
... that turns on the particular constitutional test to be employed.”348
It then proceeded in the very next sentences to employ terms like
“legitimate governmental purpose,” “fortuity,” and “capriciousness”
to undercut its point.349
Critics charge that standards of review are “rhetorical covers for
question-begging,” amount to “a kind of judicial and advocative
fraud,” are too vague or “formalistic,” and have “no textual or other
constitutional foundation.”350 To be sure, courts often use standards
of review in a way that is “clumsy, misleading, incomprehensible, or
simply mistaken.”351 And such critiques have been sharply (and
fairly) directed at the tiers of scrutiny in particular, prompting
proposed changes.352 “But it is a mistake for anyone, Justices or
commentators, to hide the use of standards of review” or to deny the
need for a standard of review in constitutional adjudication.353
Modern courts interpret constitutions in a way that conveys a hi-
erarchy or continuum of values.354 Standards of review allow courts
to sort through these values, “to typecast legal relations (rights,
immunities, etc.) into categories that require varying degrees of
justification for governments to burden or alter them.”355 Viewed in
this light, standards of review are “clarifying, not obfuscating.”356
345. See id. at 206.
346. See Black, supra note 341, at 1604, 1659.
347. See supra Part II.A.
348. Brigham I, 692 A.2d 384, 396 (Vt. 1997).
349. See id.
350. See Michael H. Shapiro, Constitutional Adjudication and Standards of Review Under
Pressure from Biological Technologies, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 351, 380, 485 (2001).
351. Id. at 485-86.
352. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 482-83
(2004).
353. See Shapiro, supra note 350, at 381.
354. See id. at 366.
355. Id. at 366-68.
356. Id. at 381-82.
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Properly calibrated and applied, standards of review can promote a
measure of “certainty and predictability in the law.”357
Frankly, whether these arguments are convincing or not, the fact
is that “standards of review pervade, if not dominate, the actual
practice of constitutional law” and “are not going to go away in the
foreseeable future.”358 Therefore, they should be “defined, designed,
and implemented to make them work as best they can.”359 With that
in mind, I propose a new standard of review—direct-proportionality
review—that could help resolve the current predicament of educa-
tion rights jurisprudence.
A. “All Things in Proportion” 360
“Proportionality,” a well-established principle of constitutional
law in the United States and a widely accepted standard of review
in other countries, is trending.361 Scholars have illuminated its
influence on our constitutional jurisprudence and have advocated
for it to assume a greater role as a formally recognized mode of
judicial review in the United States.362 Justice Stephen Breyer has
also supported the use of proportionality review in his opinions and
scholarship.363 Notwithstanding its ascension, proportionality
review, at least as it is currently utilized in other countries, would
357. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and
Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and
Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 242 (2002).
358. Spece & Yokum, supra note 203, at 287-88.
359. Id. at 288.
360. See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797 (2011).
361. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3096 (2015).
362. See id. at 3096-97; see also Stephen Gardbaum, Proportionality and Democratic Con-
stitutionalism, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASON-
ING 259, 260-61 (Grant Huscroft et al. eds., 2014); Helen Hershkoff, Privatizing Public Rights:
Common Law and State Action in the United States, in BOUNDARIES OF STATE, BOUNDARIES
OF RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS, PRIVATE ACTORS, AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 139 (Tsvi Kahana
& Anat Scolnicov eds., 2016) (“Some US state courts use an interpretive practice in their
common-law decision making that strongly resembles variations of proportionality analysis
by courts abroad.”); Mathews & Sweet, supra note 360, at 864-65. See generally E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW (2009).
363. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 682, 689-90 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTI-
TUTION 49 (2005).
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be a poor fit for adjudicating equal liberty claims under state
constitutions.
Proportionality review in nations such as Germany, Canada, and
Israel proceeds through a “multi-part sequenced set of questions.”364
That sequential form typically begins with an inquiry about ends
served by the government’s infringement of a right.365 If the in-
fringement serves “a legitimate and sufficiently important purpose,
then the constitutionality of the means used are examined through
a three-fold inquiry into: (a) rationality; (b) minimal impairment;
and (c) proportionality as such.”366 As should be readily apparent
from that description, proportionality review’s “criteria correspond
with elements in U.S. ‘strict,’ ‘intermediate,’ or ‘rational basis’ scru-
tiny: the need for a sufficiently important or ‘compelling’ govern-
ment purpose; the rational connection required between the means
chosen and the end; and the ‘minimal impairment’ inquiry into
whether there are less restrictive means towards the same goal.”367
The one glaring difference is the last inquiry. “Proportionality as
such” or “proportionality in the narrow sense” or “stricto sensu” calls
for “balancing,” though not necessarily in the manner to which we
are accustom in the United States.368 It is described differently
depending on the country or the scholar, but proportionality review
balancing essentially entails weighing the public benefits of the
challenged law (already deemed by this last stage to have a proper
purpose and to be narrowly tailored) against the harm caused by the
infringement of the constitutional right.369 It is a “result-oriented
test” that “focuses on the constitutionality of the weight of the
marginal social importance of the benefit and harm.”370
364. Jackson, supra note 361, at 3098-99, 3099 n.23 (noting that in other countries, such
as South Africa, “such questions are considered but in a less sequenced way”).
365. See id. at 3099.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See id. at 3099, 3113 n.84 (first quoting HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t
of Israel, 58(5) PD 807 (2004) (Isr.), translated in 2004 ISR. L. REP. 264, 297; and then quoting
AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 340
(2012)).
369. See AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS 340 (Doron Kalir trans., 2012); Mathews & Sweet, supra note 360, at 803.
370. See BARAK, supra note 369, at 342, 352. This type of balancing is “the most complex
and controversial part of proportionality.” Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable
Intensity of Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174, 190 (2006).
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 The means-ends inquiry and the balancing inquiry are equally
problematic concerning judicial enforcement of the state constitu-
tional right to education. The means-ends inquiry involves the most
heightened judicial scrutiny, an amalgamation of strict, interme-
diate, and rational-basis.371 As previously explained, state courts
have rightfully abandoned heightened scrutiny because it does not
accord with the affirmative or positive nature of the right to ed-
ucation.372 At its core, the means-end inquiry of proportionality
review is “state-limiting.”373 “Proportionate limitations of rights are
justifiable; disproportionate ones are not.”374 In that regard, the
proportional means-ends inquiry is suitable for negative rights
taking the form of privileges and immunities but not for positive
rights taking the form of claim-rights which are “state-inducing.”375
Whereas “negative rights have a conjunctive structure” (interference
with a legal interest protected by the right is either forbidden or it
is not), “positive rights have an alternative or disjunctive structure”
(“there is a free choice as to the means, as long as [the legal interest
protected by the right] is achieved”).376
 The balancing inquiry is more conducive to positive rights en-
forcement in that it is “optimi[z]ing” benefits and harms or compet-
ing values.377 Yet even the balancing inquiry has been primarily
focused on “whether the reasons offered by the government, relative
371. See supra Part II.B.
372. See supra Part II.A.
373. See Rivers, supra note 370, at 176.
374. Id. at 174; see also Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture
of Justification, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 463 (2011).
375. See Alison L. Young, Proportionality Is Dead: Long Live Proportionality!, in PROPOR-
TIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 43, 52 (Grant Huscroft
et al. eds., 2014) (“[S]tate-limiting theories of proportionality are connected to immunity-based
theories of rights.”).
376. MATTHIAS KLATT & MORITZ MEISTER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
PROPORTIONALITY 88-89 (2012).
377. See Rivers, supra note 370, at 176; see also Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom, Perfect
Justice, 78 B.U. L. REV. 717, 744 n.91 (1998) (“[T]he general proposition that positive rights
require balancing, while negative rights require line drawing for their closer specification.”);
cf. Eric Engle, The General Principle of Proportionality and Aristotle, in 23 IUS GENTIUM:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAW AND JUSTICE 265, 271 (Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer &
Nuno M.M.S. Coelho eds., 2013) (“[I]nterest balancing and means-end review address two
different types of rights: positive economic rights (interest balancing) and natural human
rights (means-end review).... Their fusion is an error because they address two different
categories of rights and are mathematically distinct.”).
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to the limitation on rights, are sufficient to justify the intrusion.”378
Any limitation on a right must be justified by a corresponding “gain
to the public interest.”379 If not, then the state action is curtailed or
forbidden.380 In other words, even the balancing inquiry has been
more suitably fabricated for negative rights enforcement.381
Aharon Barak, former president of the Supreme Court of Israel
and a leading proponent of proportionality review, maintains that
the balancing inquiry can be refabricated for positive rights
enforcement: the greater the marginal social importance of the
positive right and the chances of fulfilling it, the greater the
justification must be for “avoiding the enactment of legislation” to
fulfill that right.382 Notice that this move seems to embrace the
notion that constitutional rights are not “trumps” over collective
goals, or “shields” against government intrusion, but rather “optim-
ization requirements” that are only to be advanced as much as
possible given countervailing non-rights interests.383 Even assuming
that the optimization conception of rights is correct, Barak’s
proposed balancing is still primarily geared toward justifying a
limitation on a constitutional right—namely, nonfulfillment of that
right.384 In that regard, there seems to be very little difference
between nonfulfillment and intrusion in applying this “results-
oriented test.” The practical effect when balanced in the state’s favor
is to limit the right, not necessarily to optimize it. And there is
reason to believe, based on the history and present trajectory of
school finance litigation, that the balance more often would be
struck in the state’s favor out of deference to legislative preroga-
tives.385
This is not to say that courts must take the opposite approach to
“[i]nterest [b]alancing,” a “[r]ights [m]aximizing” approach in which
378. See Jackson, supra note 361, at 3099 (emphasis added).
379. See Rivers, supra note 370, at 205-06.
380. See id.
381. See KLATT & MEISTER, supra note 376, at 88.
382. See BARAK, supra note 369, at 433-34.
383. See Mathews & Sweet, supra note 360, at 872-73; see also Jackson, supra note 361,
at 3101-02. Barak contends that balancing “may well incorporate the notions of ‘rights as
trumps,’ or ‘rights as firewalls,’” though he does not say exactly how, nor does he seem to
advocate for that conception of balancing. See BARAK, supra note 369, at 490.
384. See BARAK, supra note 369, at 433-34.
385. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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they order the most effective remedies to vindicate rights no matter
the costs.386 But if rights optimization is the objective, a standard of
review should be devised with that purpose in mind. It should fulfill
the legal interests protected by the right as much as possible. And
it should be oriented toward compelling state action, if necessary,
not toward excusing it. At the same time, it should be a standard
that “seeks to accommodate ... concerns about both constitutional
rights and unlimited legislative power by neither rendering the
former an absolute bar to conflicting legislative action nor granting
legislatures an absolute power to override rights.”387 That standard
is proportionality—not means-ends review, not balancing, nor a
combination of the two.
 Proportionality first appeared in the Code of Hammurabi as a
principle of “commutative justice (‘an eye for an eye’ lex talionis).”388
But it was Aristotle who “first clearly elucidated” it as a principle of
“distributive justice,” that is, “the right ratio—the relationship
between a distributive principle and the shares apportioned there-
by.”389 “In short: enough is enough and more is too much” (and less
is too little).390 Proportionality or “proportionalism” informs other
“ethical traditions” as well, for example, natural law and utilitarian-
ism.391 In law, it is a bedrock principle in punishment, self-defense,
and the law of war.392 And as explained above, a standard of
constitutional review bears its name.393 Although that standard has
been adopted worldwide, it consists of heightened means-ends
review and balancing; it does not actually represent “proportionality
386. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588-89 (1983).
387. Gardbaum, supra note 362, at 274 (emphasis added).
388. Engle, supra note 377, at 265.
389. Id. at 265-66, 268.
390. Bernhard Schlink, Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere but Here?,
22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 292 (2012). 
391. See R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny, 85 UMKC L. REV. 207, 207
n.6 (2016) (citing GARTH HALLETT, GREATER GOOD: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONALISM (1995);
BERNARD HOOSE, PROPORTIONALISM: THE AMERICAN DEBATE AND ITS EUROPEAN ROOTS (1987);
CHRISTOPHER KAZOR, PROPORTIONALISM AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION (reprint ed. 2010)).
392. See id. at 208 n.6 (citing, inter alia, Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Punishment, and
Proportionality, 10 LAW & PHIL. 323 (1991); Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality
of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 34 (2005); Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of
Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263 (2005); Jim Staihar, Proportionality and Punishment,
100 IOWA L. REV. 1209 (2015)).
393. See supra notes 361-63 and accompanying text.
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as such.”394 Let us now explore that possibility: proportionality as its
own standard of review relative to equal liberty claims under the
state constitutional right to education.
B. How Would It Work?
Regarding the right to education, “a new paradigm must recog-
nize and, ultimately, harmonize, two fundamentally different
constitutional values,” equality and liberty.395 Convention has it that
these two values must be “balanced” or brought into constitutional
“equilibrium.”396 “The problem with balancing metaphors is that
they slip commensurability in through the back door. If values are
incommensurable, they cannot successfully be weighed against each
other. Weighing is a form of measurement that presupposes a
common unit of measure.”397 Although equality and liberty are not
incomparable, or incompatible, they are “incommensurable because
neither of these values is reducible to the other.”398
It is tempting to say that loose talk of balancing in constitutional
adjudication “is not meant to suggest anything like a literal
weighing of values ... but rather to indicate that all ultimate values
must be paid some minimum level of respect.”399 Yet the risk is that
394. See supra notes 364-67 and accompanying text.
395. See William E. Thro, Judicial Paradigms of Educational Equality, 174 EDUC. L. REP.
1, 41 (2003) (observing that these two principles represent “almost perfect illustrations of Sir
Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,’” negative liberty and positive liberty (citing BERLIN,
supra note 75)).
396. See Jessica Knouse, Reconciling Liberty and Equality in the Debate over Preim-
plantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 107, 116 (“When liberty and equality are
thus perceived as binary opposites, a presumption arises that, in any given case, the two must
be balanced to determine which should prevail and which should acquiesce.”); Timothy P.
Loper, Substantive Due Process and Discourse Ethics: Rethinking Fundamental Rights
Analysis, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 41, 49 (2006) (“There is a precarious
balancing act for our democratic government to perform in fulfilling its Constitutional
obligation to protect equality and liberty.”); Isaiah Berlin, On the Pursuit of the Ideal, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS 18 (Mar. 17, 1988), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1988/03/17/on-the-pursuit-of-
the-ideal/ [https://perma.cc/R8BZ-TW5P] (“[R]ules, values, principles must yield to each other
in varying degrees in specific situations.... The best that can be done, as a general rule, is to
maintain a precarious equilibrium that will prevent the occurrence of desperate situations,
of intolerable choices.”).
397. Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1367, 1416 (2001).
398. Id. at 1417.
399. David Wolitz, Indeterminacy, Value Pluralism, and Tragic Cases, 62 BUFF. L. REV.
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“when liberty and equality are [said to be] balanced, both are
diluted.”400 Moreover, just because equality and liberty cannot be
weighed or balanced, strictly speaking, does not mean that they
cannot enjoy some direction of fit.401
Ironically, the answer to the ancient Aristotelian enigma of how
to reconcile equality and liberty is Aristotelian proportionality.
Specifically, Aristotle understood proportionality as “the right ratio”
and “proportional equality” as a distribution that “treats all relevant
persons in relation to their due,” that is, according to their needs.402
Under this scheme “each person may be treated unequally (differ-
ently) in numerical terms; but the distribution itself is equal in the
sense that each person receives the same consideration of his needs
and interests.”403 Proportional equality is in essence, then, vertical
equity or “adequate equality.”404
To judge proportional equality (or vertical equity and adequacy)
a court must review “the consequences of various proposed distribu-
tions and evaluate[ ] them in terms of the effectiveness with which
they fulfill what are taken to be the relevant needs of the recipi-
ents.”405 Note that review in and of itself does not yield “the right
ratio” or direction of fit between vertical equity and adequacy. There
are four possibilities for that assessment. First, the status quo: the
relationship between adequacy and vertical equity can remain
erratic, subject to an ends-to-fit review that sorts them into separate
inquiries.406 Second, adequacy and vertical equity can have an
inversely proportional relationship such that when adequacy is
529, 592 (2014).
400. See Knouse, supra note 396, at 116.
401. Cf. David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 652 (1994) (“Although constitutional values do not lend them-
selves to a simple calculus, they are amenable to comparison and rough measurement on a
single scale.”); Jackson, supra note 361, at 3156-57 (“Even absent a common metric, ...
judgments about the relative priority of two values can be rational.”).
402. See Stefan Gosepath, Equality, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward
N. Zalta ed., 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/ [https://
perma.cc/R7A9-KRY6]. Proportional equality contrasts with “numerical equality” which
“treats all persons as indistinguishable” and therefore grants “them the same quantity of a
good per capita.” Id.
403. Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1168 (1969)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Equal Protection].
404. See Gosepath, supra note 402.
405. See Equal Protection, supra note 403, at 1168.
406. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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elevated, vertical equity is lowered, or vice versa.407 Third, adequacy
and vertical equity can have a directly proportional relationship and
be leveled down together.408 Fourth, adequacy and vertical equity
can have a directly proportional, upward direction of fit.409
Regarding the first possibility, it should by now be obvious that
adequacy and vertical equity should not be assessed separately
because a singular focus on one to the exclusion or ignorance of the
other yields unacceptable outcomes. Without adequacy, vertical
equity is “an unmanageable and inadequate protection” because it
cannot be properly measured nor fully achieved without a qualita-
tive threshold.410 A “baseline of adequacy” is, in fact, necessary to
identify “spending targets in relation to the ‘level of spending
needed to insure adequacy for each student category,’” to insure that
funding is meeting the needs of disadvantaged children.411 Without
vertical equity, adequacy also cannot be fully achieved and would
“otherwise tolerate resource inequities and social inequalities” that
are constitutionally inexcusable.412 Needless to say, the second and
third possibilities will not do either. Vertical equity and adequacy
should not have an inversely proportional relationship or be leveled
down together—both patterns persist in states and engender
educational disparities.413
And lo, the only place left for vertical equity and adequacy to go
is up, together. This direction of fit parallels Kenji Yoshino’s
explanation of the “synergy” between equal protection and due
process conveyed in Lawrence and Obergefell: that reliance on either
407. See Knouse, supra note 396, at 115 (“In some cases, liberty is privileged and equality
is subordinated; in others, equality is privileged and liberty is subordinated.”); Douglas S.
Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New
Judicial Federalism, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 175, 177 n.6 (1998) (“[A] state could have equitable
funding that is inadequate, or it could have adequate funding that is inequitable.”).
408. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
409. See infra note 412 and accompanying text.
410. See Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 974 & n.367; see also David R.
Matthews, Lessons from Lake View: Some Questions and Answers from Lake View School
District No. 25 v. Huckabee, 56 ARK. L. REV. 519, 533 (2003) (commenting on expert testimony
suggesting that “as long as the amount of funding for the system is inadequate, achieving an
equitable distribution of funds will be impossible”).
411. See Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 974 n.374 (quoting Colleen Fahy,
Education Funding in Massachusetts: The Effects of Aid Modifications on Vertical and
Horizontal Equity, 36 J. EDUC. FIN. 217, 231 (2011)).
412. Id. at 975.
413. See supra notes 30-33, 52-57 and accompanying text.
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equality or liberty must serve to “advance[ ] both interests”—to level
up.414 In addition to maintaining that upward, directly proportional
relationship, courts would also need to confirm that the space
between vertical equity and adequacy remains proportional, that is,
in the right ratio.
Lest all of this sound too abstract, let us examine how direct-
proportionality review could be applied in an actual case: the
Gannon litigation in Kansas. Recall that the Kansas Supreme Court
in Gannon I affirmed that its constitution’s education clause
contained both an adequacy and equity component, yet analyzed
each according to separate constitutional tests.415
For equity, the test does not require adherence to precise equality
standards (that is, equal funding per student), but rather considers
whether school districts “have reasonably equal access to substan-
tially similar educational opportunity through similar tax effort.”416
In Gannon I the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a lower three-
judge panel’s determination that the state had exacerbated wealth-
based disparities by eliminating all “capital outlay state aid,”
supplemental need-based payments to districts with lower property
wealth.417 The court further concluded that the state’s proration and
reduction of all supplemental general state aid payments to districts
that had adopted “a local option budget (LOB)” designed “to
augment [their] funding through additional mill levy” was likewise
inequitable and unconstitutional.418 Following remand, the court
held in Gannon II that the state failed to cure those inequities.419
Months later lawmakers responded by passing a bill that the court
concluded in Gannon III had cured the capital outlay inequities but
not the LOB inequities.420
For adequacy, the test is whether the structure and implementa-
tion of the financing system “is reasonably calculated to have all
414. Yoshino, supra note 16, at 172-73; cf. Knouse, supra note 396, at 117 (“Rather than
accepting the conventional—and constitutionally problematic—perception that we protect
liberty for one set of reasons and equality for another (conflicting) set of reasons, ... we ought
to protect liberty and equality for the same reasons.”).
415. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text.
416. Gannon I, 319 P.3d 1196, 1239 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam).
417. See id. at 1242.
418. See id. at 1243, 1246.
419. Gannon II, 368 P.3d 1024, 1047 (Kan. 2016) (per curiam).
420. Gannon III, 372 P.3d 1181, 1190 (Kan. 2016) (per curiam).
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Kansas public education students meet or exceed the standards set
out in Rose.”421 In Gannon IV, the court affirmed the panel’s decision
that the structure and implementation of responsive legislation
failed to satisfy the adequacy test.422 Structurally, the legislation
merely provided “a funding stopgap” for a couple of years and thus
did not actually provide a finance formula calculated to meet or
exceed the adopted Rose standards.423 In evaluating the legislation’s
implementation, the court reviewed “both the financing system’s
inputs, e.g., funding, and outputs, e.g., outcomes such as student
achievement.”424 It agreed that substantial evidence supported the
panel’s findings that low funding levels and budget cuts negatively
affected “staff, class sizes, and student opportunities” and inhibited
progress toward each of the Rose standards.425 Turning to the
outputs during the relevant period, the court observed that nearly
one-fourth of all students failed to meet basic math and reading
skills and that such nonproficiency and other achievement gaps
were disproportionately higher among certain subgroups, such as
African Americans, Hispanics, and students receiving free or
reduced-cost lunches.426
The Kansas Supreme Court should be commended for having the
courage to utilize both the equity and adequacy tests to find the
state’s action constitutionally infirm in the face of staunch legisla-
tive resistance and egregious threats to make “changes to judicial
funding and appointment.”427 To its great credit, the court also
firmly acknowledged that adequacy and equity “do not exist in
isolation from each other” and that a particular cure for one might
affect the other.428 Nevertheless, the court’s separate ends-to-fit
review of adequacy and equity limits the potential long-term impact
421. Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1236-37. Because Gannon I was the first time the court formally
adopted the Rose standards, it remanded the adequacy claim to the three-judge panel to
consider, inter alia, studies estimating the “actual costs” of providing an adequate education
in light of the Rose standards. Id. at 1237.
422. Gannon IV, 390 P.3d 461, 488 (Kan. 2017) (per curiam).
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 491-93.
426. Id. at 496-98.
427. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
428. Gannon I, 319 P.3d 1196, 1252 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam). For instance, “curing of the
equity infirmities may influence the ... assessment of the adequacy of the overall education
funding system.” Id.
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of its decisions, guaranteeing future challenges and more legislative
resistance.
Direct-proportionality review would require the court to analyze
vertical equity and adequacy together as a united claim for equal
liberty. Hence, although it is entirely appropriate for the court to
assess whether the state’s financing system is “reasonably calcu-
lated” to provide an adequate education in light of the Rose stan-
dards,429 the court should simultaneously evaluate explicitly wheth-
er disadvantaged students have the compensatory resources and
opportunities they need to actually meet those standards. Other-
wise, courts create the possibility that adequacy and vertical equity
maintain an inversely proportional relationship, with vertical
inequities preventing disadvantaged children from meeting rela-
tively high adequacy thresholds. In that case, the constitutional
mandate of adequacy for all will go unfulfilled.
Likewise, courts should judge whether a school district has
“reasonably equal access to substantially similar educational
opportunity”430 not merely by interdistrict property wealth dispari-
ties caused by supplemental state aid, but in relation to the
qualitative education threshold set by the Rose standards. In other
words, for vertical equity purposes, courts need to identify spending
targets and “define educational need as the difference between
where students should be performing academically and the level at
which they are currently performing,” that is, “how far the perfor-
mance fell short of equity.”431 Otherwise, adequacy and vertical
equity may maintain an erratic relationship (or worse) such that
both, in practice, are leveled down.
In fairness, the Kansas Supreme Court and other state courts
have at times analyzed vertical equity and adequacy together, even
if unintentionally, in utilizing studies “costing-out” an adequate
education. Essentially, these cost studies “aim to determine objec-
tively the amount of funding that is actually needed to provide all
429. See supra note 421 and accompanying text.
430. See Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1239.
431. Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 975 n.374 (first quoting Gloria M.
Rodriguez, Vertical Equity in School Finance and the Potential for Increasing School
Responsiveness to Student and Staff Needs, 79 PEABODY J. EDUC. 7, 17 (2004); then quoting
Meaghan Field, Note, Justice as Fairness: The Equitable Foundations of Adequacy Litigation,
12 SCHOLAR 403, 409 (2010)).
2017] EQUAL LIBERTY IN PROPORTION 291
students with a meaningful opportunity for an adequate educa-
tion.”432 They can therefore highlight vertical inequities as well as
cost out the additional resources needed by disadvantaged children
to reach the adequacy thresholds. Although cost studies have been
commissioned in at least forty states, sometimes in response to
court orders,433 their influence has been somewhat limited in
sustaining reforms that address educational inadequacies.
For one, cost studies tend to be conducted in “highly charged
political environments created by ongoing litigation or legislative
reform movements” and thus are subject to “intense disagreement”
about their “results and recommendations.”434 For another, courts
have been sensitive to criticisms about the costing-out methodolo-
gies and so “less than half ” of cost studies have withstood judicial
scrutiny.435 Michael Rebell has made specific recommendations for
improving the accuracy of these methodologies436 and, alternatively,
he and other scholars have proposed a new “constitutional cost
methodology” of their own.437 Yet ultimately Rebell maintains that
judicial oversight is necessary to unveil the value judgments
implicit in these costs studies, to ensure cost analysis occurs on a
regular basis to account for changing conditions and student needs,
and to expose certain excesses.438
Direct-proportionality review provides a mechanism for courts to
undertake such measures with transparency and analytical preci-
sion. Again, the trouble has been that courts have not uniformly
insisted that adequacy and vertical equity be mutually reinforcing
nor have they consistently demanded evidence (cost studies or other
empirical findings) from which they could make that assessment.439
432. Michael A. Rebell, Professional Rigor, Public Engagement and Judicial Review: A
Proposal for Enhancing the Validity of Education Adequacy Studies, 109 TCHRS. C. REC. 1303,
1304 (2007).
433. Id. at 1304-05.
434. Id. at 1305, 1326.
435. Id.
436. See id. at 1349.
437. See Michael A. Rebell et al., A New Constitutional Cost Methodology for Determining
the Actual Cost of a Sound Basic Education, TCHRS. C., COLUM. U. (Sept. 2016), http://www.
equitycampaign.org/publications/safeguarding-students-educational-rights/Constitutional-
Cost-Methodology-final,-09-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8ST-YU83].
438. See Rebell, supra note 432, at 1342-43, 1347-49.
439. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Solving “Problems No One Has
Solved”: Courts, Causal Inference, and the Right to Education, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. (forth-
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Direct-proportionality review compels that analysis and thereby
increases the chance that children’s equality and liberty interests
will be advanced together—that they will be leveled up. Indeed,
courts must have that very purpose in mind. But that is not all.
Maintaining an upward, directly proportional relationship be-
tween vertical equity and adequacy that otherwise perpetuates
second-class citizenship would imperil equal liberty. Therefore,
direct-proportionality review also requires courts to evaluate wheth-
er the margin between vertical equity and adequacy is proportional
so as to protect children from the harms of educational disparities.
That space would become disproportionate if, for example, children
just meeting the adequacy threshold could not compete on compara-
ble terms for admission to higher education and high-quality jobs
with children soaring above the adequacy threshold.440 So, in
addition to educational outcomes, courts assessing the proportional-
ity of the margin between adequacy and vertical equity could also
consider evidence of socio-economic mobility, college admissions,
and patterns of racial and class segregation. In instances of
disproportionality, the court would require the adequacy threshold
to be recalibrated to diminish the positional advantages held by
children well above the threshold, and require adjustments to the
distribution of educational opportunities to ensure vertical equity
necessary to meet the higher thresholds. Such recalibration would
also ensure that adequacy remains relational, responsive to
changing societal conditions and the needs of children.
In sum, direct-proportionality review of the state constitutional
right to education entails a two-part inquiry. First, do the state’s
actions advance children’s equality and liberty interests by ensuring
that vertical equity and adequacy maintain a mutually reinforcing,
upward trajectory? Second, is the margin between vertical equity
and adequacy proportional so as to protect children from the harms
of educational disparities?
coming 2018) (manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2886754
[https://perma.cc/33ZG-ZWAE] (“[T]he state’s own choices [concerning the production and
control of knowledge] substantially determine whether researchers—and hence litigators—can
produce credible evidence concerning the causal effect of state laws and funding arrangements
on the outcomes that ground the education right.”).
440. See Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 976.
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C. Objections and Responses
A new standard of review invites criticism. In evaluating any
standard of review, questions are most likely to be raised about its
potential to encourage objectivity and predictability in the law, to
maintain fidelity with separation of powers, and to present new and
improved ways to enforce constitutional rights.
1. “The Mask of Objectivity” 441 and Indeterminancy
“Its reasonableness and simplicity are seductive, the way it points
is sometimes too easy, the answers it provides too uncritical.”442
That has been the charge made against judicial balancing, that
though it “purport[s] to be objective, neutral, and even scientific,” it
in fact gives “judges enormous latitude in measuring values and
facts for inclusion on the scales.”443 Likewise, critics charge that
proportionality’s objectivity is a facade, that it is just another vessel
for judges to pour subjectivity into the law.444 And considering those
critiques have been made against proportionality doctrine in its
current form, they no doubt would be lobbied at direct-proportional-
ity review as well.
To be sure, direct-proportionality review does not eliminate all
subjectivity from the act of judging, which “remains the engine of
constitutional decision-making.”445 Yet there is reason to believe
that direct-proportionality review would involve fewer subjective
judgments than balancing and the ends-to-fit review that state
441. See Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of
Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 125-26 (2007) (arguing remedial proportionality remains an
inherently subjective standard).
442. Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1022, 1047 (1978).
443. See Faigman, supra note 401, at 648; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 992-95 (1987) (discussing drawbacks with sci-
entific balancing analyses).
444. See Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 882-83 (2004) (contending that
despite the “invocation of objective factors ... a key aspect of proportionality review remains
fundamentally subjective”); Thomas, supra note 441, at 126-30 (discussing the inherent
subjectivity in proportionality analysis).
445. See Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance: Judicial Review of Abortion Regulations,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1320 (2013).
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courts currently engage in.446 As the name implies, direct-propor-
tionality review directs judges in one direction: UP. There may be
subjective judgments about the length to which vertical equity and
adequacy must be leveled up, but judges can adduce from objective
facts whether they are on a mutually reinforcing, upward trajec-
tory.447 In assessing the proportionality of the margin between
vertical equity and adequacy, subjectivity again cannot be elimi-
nated, but there is reliable, objective evidence upon which courts
can find disproportionality, if not proportionality.448
Assessments of the trajectory and margin of vertical equity and
adequacy would not occur in a “black box” inside which courts mys-
446. Mathews & Sweet, supra note 360, at 804 (observing that opponents view judicial
balancing as “necessarily ad hoc, open-ended, and unprincipled from the standpoint of rights
protection” (citing Aleinikoff, supra note 443, at 984-95)); cf. Note, Resurrecting Economic
Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1380
(1990) (noting “the judicial subjectivity inherent in the means-ends examination”).
447. Although past studies have not undertaken such an evaluation, various social science
methodologies for measuring educational opportunity and adequacy can yield valid and
reliable data from which lawmakers and courts can assess, if not determine, the symbiosis
and trajectory of vertical equity and adequacy. See, e.g., BRUCE BAKER & JESSE LEVIN, AM.
INSTS. RESEARCH, EDUCATIONAL EQUITY, ADEQUACY, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE
COMMONWEALTH: AN EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM 30-43 (2014),
https://www.air.org/sites/default/files/downloads/report/AIR-EEAEO%20in%20the%20 Com
monwealth%20-%20Full%20Report%2010-09-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ALS-8LHF]; CHRIS-
TOPHER A. CANDELARIA & KENNETH A. SHORES, COURT-ORDERED FINANCE REFORMS IN THE
ADEQUACY ERA: HETEROGENEOUS CAUSAL EFFECTS AND SENSITIVITY 9-29 (2017), https://cepa.
stanford.edu/sites/default/files/cofr-efp.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9Q5-ENAW]; C. Kirabo Jackson
et al., The Effect of School Finance Reforms on the Distribution of Spending, Academic
Achievement, and Adult Outcomes 13-42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
20118, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20118.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDF4-B4X3].
448. Again, past studies have not measured the proportionality of the margin between
vertical equity and adequacy, but there are existing datasets and methodologies that could
be utilized and tailored for that purpose. See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of
Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 129 Q.J.
ECONOMICS 1553 (2014); Matthew R. Della Sala & Robert C. Knoeppel, Measuring the
Alignment Between States’ Finance and Accountability Policies: The Opportunity Gap, 23
EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Jun. 2015, at 1; Catherine Kramarczuk Voulgarides,
Edward Fergus & Kathleen A. King Thorius, Pursuing Equity: Disproportionality in Special
Education and the Reframing of Technical Solutions to Address Systemic Inequities, 41 REV.
RES. EDUCATION 61 (2017); Raj Chetty et al., Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in
Intergenerational Mobility (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23618, 2017),
http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/papers/coll_mrc_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH89-
N7U8]; Alessandra Fogli & Luminita Stevens, The Twilight of the American Dream? How
Inequality and Segregation Are Shaping Social Mobility in the U.S. (Soc’y for Econ. Dynamics,
2016 Meeting Paper No. 1684, 2016), https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2016/paper_
1684.pdf [https://perma.cc/YC24-Y25T].
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teriously weigh or balance values and interests.449 Rather, direct-
proportionality review “provides a stable framework for persuasive
reason-giving, thereby enhancing the transparency of decisions,
unlike more opaque forms of balancing.”450 The enhanced transpar-
ency “encourages or forces courts to analyze cases openly, in a
fashion that elicits direct discussion of foundational” constitutional
values.451
A related criticism might be that direct-proportionality review
does not resolve the intractable problem of indeterminacy, whereby
constitutional rights provide no “foundational assurances” on which
we can rely so long as they “can only be determined by extensive
deliberation” inviting the whims of “judicial discretion.”452 Of course,
the indeterminacy problem is ubiquitous; indeed it “appears to be
built into the nature of the legal enterprise.”453 Hence, the strength
of “the indeterminacy critique depends to an important degree on
what [direct-]proportionality review would replace.”454 On that score,
direct-proportionality avoids some of the problems of indeterminacy
that plague ends-to-fit review, for example, “problems in determin-
ing and demonstrating the effectiveness and real necessity of a
given means of pursuing a government interest; [or] problems in
recognizing and properly accounting for all of the relevant rights
and interests.”455 Additionally, like more exacting forms of scrutiny,
direct-proportionality review permits more disciplined judicial deci-
sion-making thanks to its simplicity and built-in normative stan-
dard.456
In short, direct-proportionality review does not resolve all
problems of subjectivity and indeterminacy, but it is less subjective
and more determinate than balancing and ends-to-fit review.
449. See Aleinikoff, supra note 443, at 976; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 67
(1992) (contending that standards can “make visible and accountable the inevitable weighing
process that rules obscure”).
450. Jackson, supra note 361, at 3142.
451. David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 362
(2015).
452. See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
875, 877 (2003).
453. Id. at 883.
454. See Jackson, supra note 361, at 3153-54.
455. Wright, supra note 391, at 228 (footnote omitted).
456. Cf. id. (noting the advantages of exacting judicial scrutiny).
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2. Justiciability
“Most modern theories of constitutional interpretation strive to
overcome or circumvent ... the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty.’”457
Inevitably, when a court concludes that there has been a violation
based on “one of several plausible understandings” of a constitu-
tional provision, “it removes the issue from the realm of majoritari-
an politics.”458 This difficulty seems less significant at the state level
because most state judges are elected and therefore more politically
accountable.459 Yet justiciability—meant “to resolve the perceived
countermajoritarian difficulty”460—remains a troublesome concern
even among the more active state courts.461
There are a range of conventional responses to the counter-
majoritarian difficulty: radical majoritarianism (“do away with
judicial review”); judicial restraint and minimalism (maintain a
“presumption of constitutionality” and avoid abstraction); process
theories (suspend presumption of constitutionality for certain rights
when “legislative processes cannot be expected to correct the defect,”
or “when prejudice against minorities curtails their ability to utilize
the democratic process”); and originalism (interpret constitution “to
reflect the original understanding of those who framed and ratified
it”).462 Along that range, direct-proportionality review falls some-
where between the judicial restraint and minimalism theories and
process theories.
Leaning toward judicial restraint and minimalism, direct-
proportionality review is consistent with output-based review,
jurisprudence of consequence, and the dialogic approach, in that it
generally defers to the legislative and executive branches regarding
the means to provide a vertically-equitable and adequate education.
457. Dorf, supra note 452, at 889 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962)).
458. Id.
459. Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 837, 849-50 (2011); see also Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1886-88 (2001);
Neuborne, supra note 199, at 899-900.
460. Hershkoff, supra note 459, at 1886-87 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 28 (1962)).
461. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
462. See Dorf, supra note 452, at 890-99 (discussing these responses).
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“Legislatures, not courts, have the best institutional ability to
identify and assess the efficacy of means. When courts do second-
guess legislative choices of this nature, they tend to be either
proceeding ad hoc or disguising their true concerns.”463 Even when
the scrutiny is scaled back to the degree of fit between the means
and ends—“an empirical problem” that “science, scholarship, and
experience can help” to solve—judges in the end are left with “as-
sumptions, contradictory experiences, and as many expert opinions
as there are interests involved.”464 Notwithstanding the deference
to “legislatures and executive officials as the ‘primary decisionmak-
ers,’” a “‘proportionality analysis’ by courts can serve as a check
against serious disproportionalities.”465
Leaning toward process theories, direct-proportionality review
does not provide as much deference as Scott Bauries’s proposed
review of legislative process over substance.466 Given that courts
have recognized the right to education as one vital to the democratic
process,467 that would yield too much ground. Nevertheless, direct-
proportionality review would not require the court to turn a blind
eye toward process failures. On the contrary, serious
“disproportionalities in the effects of government action may be a
signal of failures in the legislative process that warrant increased
scrutiny by the courts”—failures like “lawmakers’ insufficient con-
cern with disproportionate effects on the relatively powerless” or
“unconscious or unarticulated prejudices.”468
Direct-proportionality review is—after all—a standard, not a
rule.469 Nothing about direct-proportionality review, however, would
preclude a court from adopting some of Derek Black’s proposed
prophylactic rules, decision-making structures, and deterrence-
based remedies.470 Indeed, such proactive intervention might be
necessary to advance vertical equity and adequacy in tandem while
463. Bhagwat, supra note 226, at 308-09.
464. See Schlink, supra note 390, at 299.
465. See Jackson, supra note 361, at 3147 & n.245 (citing SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note
362, at 8).
466. See supra Part III.E.
467. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
468. See Jackson, supra note 361, at 3151.
469. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 385 (1985) (noting
standards provide “evaluative terms,” enabling “individualized judgments”).
470. See supra Part III.F.
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ensuring the margin between them remains proportional. Ulti-
mately, however, as Black recognizes, education cannot be governed
entirely by rules; standards are needed to guide courts and the other
branches.471 This is particularly the case with adequacy and vertical
equity because they are dynamic and relational demands which are
not best suited by static categorical rules. “Even if ‘categorical’ rules
would result in fewer errors ... a standard may result in fewer
‘serious’ errors, or departures from a common sense of constitutional
justice, than its ‘categorical’ counterpart.”472
At bottom, direct-proportionality review addresses the justiciabil-
ity concerns by being at once more and less deferential to legislative
prerogatives and staking out a vital role for the judiciary in enforc-
ing equal liberty under the right to education.
3. Nothing New Here
“Not all rights have the same conceptual structure[,]... play the
same role within the constitutional system[,]” or “involve the kinds
of principles that can best be applied through ideas of proportional-
ity.”473 The right to education is compatible with principles of
proportionality, however, because of its conceptual structure—its
forms and function. As discussed, the right to education takes the
form of both a positive claim-right to an adequate education and a
negative immunity against inequitable distributions of educational
opportunity.474 There are other rights, such as the right to marry,
with “the somewhat distinctive feature of being both a positive and
a negative right.”475 Such rights require synchronization to effectu-
ate both their positive and negative dimensions. For the right to
education, that synchronization is achieved by directing state action
to sustain the right’s core function: “to protect children from being
disadvantaged in life by disparities in educational opportunity.”476
471. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
472. Jackson, supra note 361, at 3155.
473. Id. at 3167-68 (footnote omitted).
474. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
475. See Yoshino, supra note 16, at 168.
476. Weishart, Reconstituting, supra note 34, at 958. The function of most other rights is
to authorize the rightholder’s actions, exempt him or her from some general duty, afford
discretion concerning some action, or entitle the rightholder to specific performance. See id.
at 954-55.
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To enforce this protection function, courts need a standard of re-
view that focuses the judicial lens on whether children’s liberty and
equality interests are being advanced by elevating vertical equity
and adequacy while keeping the margin between them proportional.
This dual inquiry serves both dimensions of the right to education:
improving vertical equity and adequacy together serves the positive
claim-right dimension, while ensuring the proportionality of the
margin between them serves the negative immunity dimension.
Admittedly, this idea of proportionality is nothing new; indeed, it
is ancient—but it has never been applied in this way.
CONCLUSION
It is a “stunted image of our nation as a land that can afford one
of two dreams—liberty or equity—but cannot manage both.”477 It
does not have to be this way. State courts were among the first to
accept the interrelation of these constitutional principles and are
thus posed to lead the nation in reconstituting the right to education
to incorporate them. Part of what holds them back is their alle-
giance to a mode of constitutional review that they have long since
forsaken. In truth, “there are no silver bullets to improving educa-
tion.”478 But with direct-proportionality review we can at least allow
ourselves to reimagine the dream of equality and liberty in educa-
tion.479 That vision of equal liberty can no longer be made to teeter
on a standardless balance but must remained fixed in one propor-
tional direction.
477. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 173 (1991).
478. Black, supra note 341, at 1604.
479. Although it is fitting to start with the right to education, direct-proportionality review
has potentially broader application when equal protection and due process are brought to bear
on similar claims for equal liberty. Cf. Joseph Fishkin, Voting as a Positive Right: A Reply to
Flanders, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 29, 34 n.27 (2011) (“The right to vote on an equal basis with
other citizens ... sounds in both liberty and equality.”).
